Malta needs to play its security role to the fullest

The crisis that hit Libya in 2011 first affected Malta when two Libyan Mirage air force jets made an emergency landing at the international airport at Luqa. As the crisis in Libya worsened, Malta eventually provided safe-haven to approximately 8,000 foreigners from over 50 countries that had to be evacuated.

Malta was internationally commended for its role in the crisis, not just because it served as a hub for the evacuation efforts but also because it facilitated United Nations (UN) Resolution 1976 by opening its airspace to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces

Malta’s response was indeed remarkable when one considers that it is one of the EU’s smallest members and that its armed forces and emergency response forces are relatively small by European standards.

However, a great dose of reality is required when assessing Malta’s involvement in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Let us be frank, given the country’s size and resources, its contributions to operations will be miniscule and it will never be in a position to launch and lead a CSDP mission – in defence terms Malta is but a drop in the ocean.

Indeed, Malta does not even have a dedicated Ministry of Defence and in 2012 it had 1,510 military personnel; 97 civilian personnel; 20 troops deployed (a total of 1.3 per cent of its total military personnel); 105 deployable land forces; and 30 sustainable land forces. Even though this means that Malta’s deployability rate surpassed Cyprus in 2012 – incredible given that Cyprus’ defence budget is much higher than Malta’s – Malta is a dwarf in military terms.

Yet Malta’s involvement in the CSDP should not be completely overlooked for three main reasons.

Firstly, its geographical location puts it at the centre of any Mediterranean crises that may emerge in the future. For historical reasons Malta has declared itself a neutral state, but it increasingly recognises that it has a security role to play in the Mediterranean Sea. It will not become a NATO member anytime soon – although it is a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) – and activists regularly denounce NATO naval stop-offs at Valletta as anti-constitutional. Until Malta recognises that its self-declared neutrality is a remnant of Cold War politics, it will feel comfortable playing just a minor role in the CSDP.

Malta will never be in a position to spend ambitiously on defence, and it certainly will never own a naval fleet on a par with most of its fellow European states. The point, rather, is about using defence spending commitments to make a political statement and to ultimately overcome accusations of ‘free riding’.

Consider that in 2012 Malta spent a meagre €39.3 million on defence or just 0.58 per cent of GDP – nowhere near the NATO 2 per cent average. The bulk goes on personnel (€32 million) with €6.2 million being spent on operational and maintenance-related expenditure. Just €1.1 million was spent on infrastructure, investment and operational costs in 2012. More should be done to ensure that Malta lives up to the basic responsibilities bestowed upon it by geography, history and circumstance.

Secondly, should a crisis in the Mediterranean occur then Malta might have a political, cultural and historical added value in dealing with crisis-hit countries.

For example, after the Libya crisis, the Maltese Chief of Defence and his Libyan counterpart met in February 2012 to discuss bilateral naval exercises with Libyan forces off the coast of Tripoli. Malta sent its P61 offshore patrol vessel and the exercises were made on explosive ordinance disposal, vessel protection, seamanship, vessel boarding techniques, diving, etc. Malta and Libya also agreed to an 88-week training programme for 33 Libyan military officials in order to develop border control and search. In this sense, the skills of the AFM should not be underestimated. Indeed, not every EU member state would have been a position to deal with the Libyan forces in such a manner – Malta’s historical and political links to Libya mattered.

Thirdly, even though Malta plays an extremely minor role in CSDP operations, it has been able to develop its domestic crisis management response mechanisms. One should not forget that Malta is well-versed in maritime operations given the frequency with which refugees, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants arrive on Maltese shores. During the Libya crisis – a crisis which was largely unanticipated – AFM officers were following developments during the ‘Arab Spring’ and drew up contingency plans and a number of likely scenarios for a larger crisis.

At the heart of Maltese debates about security and defence lie resources, geography and neutrality. Malta will never have the resources needed to be a big player in European defence, although it does use its expertise and added value were necessary and possible to play its part.

In terms of operational commitment, therefore, Malta is not a free rider and it does try to act tall within its means; however, in terms of its defence spending it will, for the time being at least, look like a free rider.

Malta cannot do anything about its geography but it can invest in equipment (vessels and aircraft) that can help it overcome geographical constraints. It is stuck at the heart of the Mediterranean and will therefore have to remain responsive to crises that will inevitably emanate from Africa.

Perhaps here it should play a bigger political role in the EU Maritime Security Strategy, although much more EU financial support and solidarity is required. Nationalist MEP Roberta Metsola recently said that it would be good for EUNAVFOR to deploy to the Mediterranean – such ideas are very welcome. Indeed, other EU member states seem to forget that Malta is one of the EU’s most crucial frontier states and will require assistance to meet its responsibilities.

Finally, Malta will need to continue its national debate over neutrality. Security and defence, by its very nature, is not neutral and Malta no longer finds itself in the midst of a Cold War. It has – by virtue of its EU membership – made a clear political statement that it is bound to the West. Additionally, crises are flaring up on Malta’s doorstep: Libya remains in flames and the growing threat from ISIL in that country should not be overlooked.

Malta does not need to surrender its neutrality to play its part in defeating a barbaric terrorist organisation, even if any role played by the country would be humanitarian rather than military. In this context, Malta should recognise that being a member of NATO’s PfP does not guarantee the country any protection in the face of threats to its essential security. True, under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (the “mutual defence clause”) other EU member states are obliged to assist and aid Malta in the event of armed aggression on its territory.

Yet building trust on defence matters means a country has to play its role when other countries are in need – it is a credibility issue. Being a security ‘free rider’ on other EU members reflects badly on Malta.

Indeed, the country needs to recognise that it cannot haul up anchor and move to a safer place if things go bad so it should play its security role to the fullest, albeit within its means.

This is an abridged version of the article that first appeared on European Geostrategy, 17 February 2015 and can be accessed here.