The Whip: creature of convention
The relationship between the Whip and MPs is based on party loyalty
Our system of parliamentary democracy based on cabinet government takes it for granted, on the basis of the evolution of constitutional practices and British constitutional conventions, that the Whip has persuasive powers over all MPs within his or her political formation. All MPs are subject in the House of Representatives to the political discipline of the party from which they hail and this task is entrusted solely to the party Whip or, in his or her absence, the Assistant Whip.
Party discipline entails that all members of the parliamentary group, itself also a creature of convention, have to faithfully follow the instructions imparted by the party Whip and, should they disagree with such instructions, it is the Whip’s duty to mediate between the party’s leadership and the dissident MP to bring the latter to order. Not following the Whip’s instructions entails the taking of disciplinary action by the party against recalcitrant MPs. This is because the relationship between the Whip and MPs is based on party loyalty. Loyalty entails obedience to the Whip’s command and is a very much cherished virtue within the constitutional organisation of political parties.
Since Malta became a republic, we have witnessed two notable instances where the Whip’s orders were totally disregarded, not to say outrightly challenged by these MPs, starting with Dom Mintoff under the premiership of Alfred Sant and ending with Franco Debono under the premiership of Lawrence Gonzi.
Both backbenchers decided to disobey their respective party Whip when the political party to which they owed allegiance was in power and decided to hijack their parliamentary group and go their own way.
This, as expected, provoked a reaction from the respective party leaderships. Dr Sant went so far as to publicly proclaim Mr Mintoff a ‘traitor’ whilst the Nationalist Party executive censured Dr Debono. Both MPs decided to run counter to the constitutional convention whereby the members of the parliamentary group have to follow unquestioningly the instructions communicated to them by the party leadership via their respective Whip. To do otherwise is conducive either to their expulsion from the parliamentary group (if not from all party structures) or to the MP’s resignation from both the parliamentary group and party structures. At least this is what one expects to happen in grave circumstances where party discipline, in and by itself, is not enough a severe measure to censure the MP’s disobedient conduct.
A two-party system with a majority of one MP can cause great maladies to the governability of a country where an MP is perceived by the Whip as misbehaving. Mr Mintoff not only crossed the party line when he voted against his own party’s Whip instructions, leading to the downfall of Alfred Sant’s democratically elected government. I cannot contemplate a situation where those same electors who had elected Mr Mintoff would have voted, if they were given the opportunity, to topple their own government.
As events unfolded, Dr Sant was left with no alternative option but to advise the President of Malta to dissolve the House and proceed to an unwarranted, though inevitable, early general election. By his vote, Mr Mintoff had sabotaged Dr Sant and the Labour Party in government. Mr Mintoff wanted to dictate Dr Sant’s political agenda but when Dr Sant refused to budge Mr Mintoff put spokes in the Labour government’s wheels until he brought down his own government. Once Mr Mintoff transformed himself into a ‘rebel’, he could no longer be trusted by the Labour Parliamentary group as he was not taking his political party’s side but serving the case of their political adversary, the Nationalist Party.
Dr Debono, a government MP, abstained and voted once against the Whip’s instructions; and, on a separate occasion, voted against the government budget. This latter instance brought about the end of the Nationalist government. It was at this stage that Dr Gonzi, reluctantly but with not much of an alternative available, found himself in the shoes of his political adversary, Dr Sant, and had to go for an election after having led a moribund government which was awaiting the final coup de grace from Dr Debono to arrive from one moment to another.
From a constitutional point of view, no MP should be in a position to dictate his own Prime Minister’s and Cabinet’s political agenda. Mr Mintoff and Dr Debono not only stood up to their own Whip, Leader, Cabinet, parliamentary group and party, but even brought the unexpected departure from office of their own respective government. Both backbenchers put their own political interest before that of the political party they formed part of and the electorate which returned them to the House. Their conduct, though isolated when one takes into account Malta’s 51 years since its emergence as an independent state, has brought about a rupture of our constitutional system which requires MPs to follow the Whip’s instructions.
If MPs disagree with their respective party’s policies, they are free to challenge these policies within party structures but in terms of the constitutional convention recognizing the office of Whip they are prohibited from bringing the demise of their own government.
Where they disagree with their own government’s policies, they are fully entitled to voice their concerns within the parliamentary group or party structures. If their views are brushed aside, totally ignored or rejected with disdain, then they do not have a right to declare war in the House on their own Prime Minister and government. For although they have been elected to the House, they did so on the party ticket. Were it not for the party which accepted them in its fold, in all probability they would never have made it to the House on their own steam as independent candidates. Hence, as representatives of electors they cannot ignore the fact that their primary allegiance is to the political party from which they hail and that they form part of a team.
Their discordance with the party, howsoever principled, correct, objective and representative of the national interest, is subdued by the wider picture – the political party’s direction as communicated to them by the Whip. The proper conduct where an MP is not willing to accept to submit him/herself to such direction is unquestionably to resign. But in Malta the culture of resignation is anathema to the political class. The political slogan of an MP was and remains: ‘Once an MP, always an MP’, at least until s/he is voted out of office by the electorate!
Our political parties – in the interest of governability – should well consider constitutionalising the office of Whip and Assistant Whip in our Constitution together with outlining their rights and duties to ensure that there is no repetition of these past episodes, which bring the governance of a whole country to a standstill, place it at the mercy of a sole or handful of MPs irrespective of the genuineness of their claims and detract the political class from addressing issues which are more fundamental to the governance of the state than the political uncertainties rebellious MPs bring about through party disloyalty.
The situation worsens where the discord is not one based on principle but on a personality clash with the party Leader or higher echelons of government, or careerism which went sour, as when MPs are denied ministerial posts or other offices or advantages. The political parties owe to the people a more serene atmosphere in the House, conducive to a proper governance of the state. In the same way that both sides of the bipolar unicameral House came together in the past, notably at least on three occasions, to resolve electoral freaks, they should come together to resolve individual freaks not only in the interest of the well-being of their own political party but also and, more importantly, in the interest of the country as a whole. They should be guided by the dictum: ‘Once bitten, twice shy’.
Misbehaviour of MPs in the House to the extent that it brings about the undoing of a government is normally neither in the interest of the political parties represented in Parliament nor of us citizens who have to witness a powerless House incapable of carrying out its constitutional duties and government’s electoral mandate. With an eight seat majority in the House, the current Labour Government does not have such a difficulty in this legislature, which has produced an out of the ordinary electoral result, but nobody knows what there is in reserve for subsequent administrations. As the adage goes, ‘prevention is better than cure’.