The presidential drift

The Malta Employers Association has taken a leaf out of Lawrence Gonzi's book by proposing the appointment of technocrats as ministers.

Cables revealing Gonzi's private complaint to a former US ambassador - that he had a limited talent pool from which to choose his ministers, and his secret wish to appoint technocrats as ministers - may well have been small talk of little political significance.

But seen in the light of the 'GonziPN' strategy, through which Gonzi lent his surname to his party's brand name, it could well have represented a yearning for a more 'presidential' style of government where the Prime Minister has a freer hand in choosing his team of ministers.

The Maltese Constitution rules out such a prospect by stating that that it is the President of Malta who appoints as prime minister the member of parliament who, in the opinion of the President, is best able to command a majority of the members of the House of Representatives.

Changing the constitution to allow Prime Ministers to choose non-elected parliamentarians could surely widen the pool of talent to people who do not want to directly get embroiled in constituency politics, but it would seriously deform our parliamentary democracy.

The major problem with technocrats in government is the weakening of political parties and parliamentary groups and the strengthening of Prime Ministers with presidential aspirations. 

By doing away with the obligation to appoint someone from their peers, they would be able to pick people from their own kitchen Cabinets. While ministers elected on a party platform are accountable to both constituents and rank and file party members, unelected technocrats will be only loyal to their sole maker: the Prime Minister of the day.

Surely technocracy would represent a natural evolution of 'GonziPN' and Muscat's movement of moderates and progressives. Muscat's concept of "star candidates" seems in itself to be part of this drift towards a presidential system, as these candidates seem to more intent on emphasising their direct link to the leader than their militancy in the party. But at least these candidates are still seeking popular legitimacy and will be contesting under a party banner.

Both phenomena represented a movement away from the strong parties of the past towards greater concentration of power at the top. 

One may well argue that political parties are in decline and people worldwide are more ready to identify with leaders offering soundbites than with policy platforms and manifestos.

One can also argue that there is nothing new in this presidential drift as both Fenech Adami and Mintoff were themselves powerful leaders who dominated their parties.

But as Franco Debono correctly points out Guido De Marco did provide a healthy balance to Fenech Adami's style of leadership. 

Alfred Sant was also limited in his presidential aspirations accepting the party as the locus of internal decision-making. In fact in 1996 the PL presented its leadership as triumvirate composed of the leader and his two deputy leaders. 

That said both parties failed in developing internal democratic structures where the various ideological shades are reflected.  Therefore social liberals never found a solid voice in the PN's leadership while Muscat ended up creating a phantasmagorical movement of 'progressives and moderates' (which lacks any structures or organisational reality) instead of pushing his own brand of PN-lite pro business policies infused with a dose of social liberalism through real debate in party structures. 

One way to address this democratic deficit would be a democratisation of political parties, the organisation of currents representing different shades of opinion within parties and reforming the electoral system to move towards a continental system of government based on coalitions between real parties.

Unfortunately Malta seems to be moving in the direction of a US style presidential system where parties are weak and leaders strong. Not surprisingly the only aspect of American democracy resisted in Malta is that of electoral primaries where party members choose party leaders representing different shades of opinion.

Ironically one consequence of this process is a weakening of identities based on ideology and a strengthening of identities based on sheer personal affinity towards poster boy politicians who pick and choose their 'experts' from the same pool of business friendly orthodoxy.

In fact it is not such a surprise that business lobbies tend to warm up to technocrats who speak their own language than to politicians who have to seek the votes of working class constituents.

Another risk of technocrats in government is the widening the rift between the parliamentary backbench and the cabinet; something, which we have already experienced with Richard Cachia Caruana, an unelected cabinet member whose role has been openly questioned by MPs on the government side.

One serious limit for Gonzi's more presidential aspirations was an election result yielding a one-seat majority in parliament.  The contest for the election of deputy leader could be a welcome opportunity for a real contest where ideas are openly discussed.  The risk is that this contest would end up serving as launching pad for a yet another presidential contender.

Yet with Labour poised to win with a more substantial majority in parliament, the temptation of a presidential system could be become even harder to resist.  In this sense Labour is duty bound to come out with its concrete blueprint for constitutional reform now before the election, than shelve this responsibility to an unelected  'constitutional convention' entrusted with founding a "second republic", whatever that means.