No ordinary whitewash

The report issued by the Commission for the Holistic Reform of Justice to analyse the reasons for the PN's defeat takes a very broad sweep at the question it was tasked to answer: so broad, in fact, that at moments it seems to also take in Malta's entire political establishment.

At a glance it is nothing if not an outright indictment of the overall stewardship at all levels  of the Nationalist Party in the preceding five years... and this makes a refreshing change from the traditional whitewash so many of these exercises so often turn out to be.

As for the individual concerns it raises, all that can be said here is that none was particularly surprising. Much emphasis is placed on exactly the same factors that were repeatedly outlined in this newspaper and elsewhere throughout the campaign. As expected, it is highly critical of the role played by rebels such as Franco Debono - even though, amusingly, it reaches the exact same conclusions the troublesome backbencher was insisting on for the past two years (primarily, the party financing law).

Former prime minister Lawrence Gonzi often seems to be shielded from direct blame, but his lack of leadership acumen becomes inescapable as one reads through one mishandled crisis after another.

But when it comes to what may seem peripheral issues to an outsider - albeit vitally important to the proper administration of a party and government - a whole new picture swims into view.

Of particular interest is the section about block voting in sectional committee elections. The report notes that MPs or candidates often resort to this practice to ensure that 'their people' take up all the administrative positions in their sector. This caused 'valid people' to feel disconnected from the party, and contributed to the voter haemorrhage.

Trivial though it may appear, this single detail strikes right at the heart of a deeper underlying political culture that underpins both major parties. It is indicative of a general lack of internal checks and balances to prevent individual factions from taking over the entire administration of the party - an issue that has affected both PN and Labour in the recent past.

Looking beyond the commission's immediate remit, this points towards the serious need for both parties to undertake radical internal restructuring exercises that go well beyond addressing financial problems alone. What is needed to prevent further fragmentation, the report seems to suggest, is to ensure fair representation for all internal voices within the party structures.

And there is more: among the proposals is a maximum limit of 10 years for anyone occupying the roles of party leader, Cabinet Minister and the like. The proviso is admittedly worded in general terms, and if applied to Simon Busuttil it would mean the current leader would be expected to resign only after losing the next two consecutive elections. Add to these a European election next June, and the fact that Busuttil has already fronted one failed campaign, 10  years' leeway may appear somewhat generous.

Nonetheless, the proposal does home in on a long-felt problem in the inherent structure of Maltese politics: the longevity of party leaders and Cabinet Ministers. The Nationalist Party has only had four leaders since Independence half a century ago; Labour exactly the same. In most cases it was painfully visible that the ailing leader had turned from an asset to a liability. Gonzi is an obvious example, albeit under rather unique circumstances. Borg Olivier was certainly perceived to be one after losing the 1976 election. Ditto Alfred Sant in 2008.

Taken out of context, the idea of imposing a maximum term on executive roles is not to be dismissed out of hand. It remains highly debatable, however, whether to impose this as a statutory party regulation (possibly even through legislation, as is the case with the president of  the United States) or merely to establish it as conventional best practice. Many will certainly question the wisdom of being forced, by party or national regulations, to change a winning horse, especially if there is no serious alternative. Either way, the issue itself merits further analysis.

There is, however, a less commendable aspect to the commission's analysis. At various instances the report singles out specific government policies as contributing factors in the defeat, without pausing to evaluate those policies and to ask whether 'electoral popularity' would be a wise factor in deciding to jettison or change them.

One example is the Gonzi administration's policy on immigration. The report notes that although the PN was decidedly anti-racist, it failed to transmit this message well in the face of a hawkish Labour Party currying favour with a tough stance on irregular immigration.

One is relieved to note emphasis on the anti-racism part, but the veiled implication here seems to be that a shift towards the more populist position might help win back votes.

Similar overtones also creep into the parts about hunting and public land issues such as the Armier squatters' compromise.

All in all, however, the report does place its finger squarely on the root of the problems currently facing the PN, even if the real substance will not be found in the rather vague recommendations at the end.