In 2011: The divorce referendum, Gonzi’s Catch 22

For Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi, the two possible outcomes of a referendum on divorce held in 2010 are equally negative. 

If the ‘yes’ camp wins, he will have lost a major political battle which would almost certainly weaken his leadership. If the ‘no’ camp wins, he would have opened the floodgates for the liberals to desert his party.

As recently pointed out by PN international secretary John Bonello: in the case of a ‘yes’ victory, Gonzi’s position would be similar to that of Belgian Christian Democratic Prime Minister Wilfred Martins, who had to resign in 1990 after parliament approved a law that permitted abortion.

One option for Gonzi would be to refrain from participating in the campaign. This would minimise the impact of defeat for his government, but would invite accusations of betrayal from disappointed conservatives who would blame him for taking the country to a referendum, only to refuse to lead his own troops.

In fact, the fallout of a defeat will be tremendous, to a party which over the past decade has evolved in to a coalition between conservatives and liberals. Gonzi’s leadership would be openly questioned both by the victorious liberals led by a stronger Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando and by disappointed conservatives who could blame him for leading them towards defeat. 

And even if divorce is approved by the people, conservative Nationalist MPs –including Gonzi – would still have to vote for the divorce bill in parliament. The most conservative of them might well choose to put their conscience before the popular mandate, creating even more confusion.

But even a ‘no’ victory could be unsettling for Gonzi, and might well prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for a party which would be increasingly identified with moral conservatism. It could further unsettle Gonzi’s one-seat majority, especially if a disappointed ‘yes’ camp recriminates an unbalanced referendum campaign.

But more significantly, it could be a bad omen for the PN’s prospects in the 2013 election, as liberals would end up deserting the Nationalist Party: either towards the pro-divorce Greens, whose visibility may increase in the referendum campaign, or directly towards Joseph Muscat’s Labour.

In fact, a ‘no’ victory could increase internal pressure on Muscat to clearly commit his party to introduce divorce through a vote in parliament if elected. Yet this could be too much of a bold step for the cautious Muscat, who would probably promise another referendum in the same way Eddie Fenech Adami had promised to do, had the ‘no’ camp won in the EU referendum in 2003.

Irrespective of the political fallout for Gonzi and Muscat, a ‘no’ victory would be a heavy psychological blow for the pro-divorce cause. In this sense, by accepting the referendum challenge, the newly set up ‘Yes’ movement has burdened itself with a great responsibility, pitting itself against the church goliath in an unequal contest that gives the ‘no’ camp a running start, on several levels.

For despite polls showing a majority for the moderate divorce proposed by the ‘Yes’ movement, the Church could be in a better position to exercise its soft power to influence consciences while still using formal and informal parish networks to mobilise its full force come referendum day. 

For unlike telephone surveys (where people express an opinion in the comfort of their armchairs) in a referendum, people will be expected to actually go out and vote on an issue which in the majority of cases doesn’t affect them directly.

Another advantage comes from the power of incumbency. For it will be an anti-divorce government which will be calling the shots by choosing the question of the referendum and setting ad hoc rules for the campaign.

One thing is certain: a referendum cannot be held in 2012 or 2013, as this would be too close to an election. The Prime Minister’s choice boils down to whether to hold the referendum in the next few months, or after the 2013 election.

Gonzi’s reluctance to commit himself to a referendum date might well suggest that the Prime Minister is still weighing his options.

Ultimately, Gonzi has only himself to blame for his quandary. For by saying that the divorce issue was too important to be decided by parliament, he has limited his choices to settling this issue either through a referendum or a general election.

Since the latter choice would be suicidal for the PN – as it would give liberals no other option but to desert the party – a referendum remains the only way of keeping the Nationalist coalition together.

Polls also suggest that the majority would prefer it if the issue were settled in a referendum. But the same polls also show that the vast majority would like the issue to be fully resolved before the next election.

The problem for Gonzi remains the timing of the referendum. 

For while a majority would like the referendum to be held before the next election, this goes against Gonzi’s electoral self-interest, which would be best served by a pledge in the party’s electoral manifesto to conduct the referendum after 2013.

In this way, he would still be able to convince liberals that a conservative government has it in itself to introduce divorce.

Yet apart from sounding opportunistic by sacrificing principle on the altar of electoral convenience, Gonzi risks a final showdown with Pullicino Orlando, who claims that the Prime Minister has already committed himself to hold a referendum in 2011.

Perhaps Gonzi is convinced that Pullicino Orlando will never risk political annihilation by threatening to bring the government down over the divorce issue, and that he can easily stall the debate.

But if Pullicino Orlando is in kamikaze mode, the only choice for Gonzi will be two years of Chinese torture between the referendum result and the election.