Grech’s Sisyphean predicament: one step forward, two steps back

Change is essential in the renewal of political parties and as Joseph Muscat himself used to say before 2013, change can come in the shape of a ‘political earthquake’.

The key is how to manage these ‘earthquakes’.

In politics timing is crucial and on the second day of the campaign, the PN experienced an earthquake which turns back the media focus on the party’s internal troubles and away from Labour’s.

As things stand the party has no choice but to put on a brave face, face the music and emphasise renewal.

The problem is that just days before D-Day, voters will continue associating the PN with confusion in contrast to Labour’s unity, which is projected as a political virtue despite the perils of blind devotion to the leader, as exposed by Joseph Muscat’s fall from grace.

In short, this sorry spectacle is of the PN’s own making, and it makes it even harder for mainstream voters to imagine an alternative PN government, which guarantees stability. For if you can’t keep your house in order, how can you be expected to govern the country serenely?

The boulder rolls back

And while few actually think that the PN will be in government – and for many the next election is all about the size of the margin and the PN’s ability to renew itself with new blood – the latest crisis exposes Bernard Grech Sisyphean predicament, that of making a few steps forward, only to get rolled back to the starting point by the same proverbial boulder.

Polls have so far showed Grech’s gains in opinion polls constantly reserved whenever trouble brewed in his party, as was the case when Delia turned up at the Independence celebration with his ‘blue shirts’.

And all this comes as a demoralising blow after the party showed signs of vitality and preparedness immediately after Robert Abela blew the whistle. Yet the latest crisis also raises big questions on Grech’s ability to manage internal rifts, defuse and resolve them before these explode in his face at the worse time possible.

And while Grech has managed to keep the energetic Adrian Delia on board, the latest rift is still partly rooted in the trauma of a leadership change, which took place just two years before the general election.

The simultaneous Facebook ‘withdrawals’ of Mario Galea, a former parliamentary secretary under Eddie Fenech Adami, Kristy Debono, who was elected by 4,012 votes in the 2017 election, and Clyde Puli, a former parliamentary secretary and PN secretary-general, seem to be rooted in the first divide.

Clyde Puli was the only one of the three to suggest an ideological motivation be making reference to the party’s position on abortion, in what could have been a dig against Grech’s ‘tolerance’ for pro-choice elements in the party.

A district heavyweight, Puli incarnated the socially conservative values of the party, having orchestrated a shambolic MEP elections campaign in 2019 in which the party tried to turn the election into a referendum on abortion.

And while his departure may be seen as an inevitable consequence of the party’s greater openness to the liberal views of a segment of its voters, ideological rifts have to be resolved before, not during an electoral campaign.

The question facing the three MPs is ‘why did they have to wait for the second day of the campaign to withdraw their candidature?’ But the question facing Grech is whether better micro-management and human relations would have averted the abrupt departure of Mario Galea, an outspoken MP who was universally respected for his frankness on discussing his own mental health issues, and whose stance against zoos resonated with a segment of younger voters and animal lovers.

Claudio Grech’s decision seems to have completely different motivations and was choreographed in an event in Valletta, as the fulfillment of the MP’s commitment to make space for the party’s regeneration in an event where he even anointed a district successor, possibly irking other candidates in the district.

Moreover, Claudio Grech did not belong to the Delia faction like the three other MPs, and actually contributed to deposing the former leader. Grech also framed his resignation as a way to facilitate the party’s much needed regeneration while still contributing to the party’s electoral programme.

In fact, Grech - a former acolyte of Austin Gatt – himself had proposed that veteran candidates should make way for new blood and he has now honored his pledge. And while unlike Puli’s, Grech’s decision was not motivated by ideological considerations, his departure from the parliamentary group where he stood his ground against the liberalisation of cannabis laws forcing his own leader to backtrack after declaring his support for cannabis clubs, facilitates a transition to a more socially liberal direction. While his conservatism may have been off-putting for potential liberal voters, his competence was undisputable and his departure weakens the party’s frontbench.

Learning from Muscat’s playbook?

While painful and wrongly timed, any party which renews itself inevitably loses some of its pieces.

When Muscat transformed Labour into a more inclusive social liberal movement, he inevitably lost ultra-conservatives like Adrian Vassallo but did not suffer severe consequences, as this was perceived to be part of a process.

Muscat had also removed a heavyweight like Anglu Farrugia from deputy leader right before the election, but he projected it as demonstration of his ability to take hard decisions, and he also cushioned the impact by appointing Louis Grech, who was a more middle-class friendly face in his place, and then by appointing Farrugia Speaker.

Under Muscat, Labour continued losing pieces, including Marlene and Godfrey Farrugia and more recently former Rabat mayor Charles Azzopardi. But by the time this happened, these politicians had already been delegitimised by the onslaught of the party media.

Others from the party’s ‘old left’ like Marie Louise Coleiro-Preca were kicked upstairs as the party opened up both to fresh ideas but also to toxic elements from the PN. Ultimately this turned Muscat’s and later Abela’s party into a cheerleading club gelled by a sense of loyalty to the leader, which is somewhat alien to liberal-democratic western parties. It was this subservience to the leader, which crippled the party in its reaction to Panamagate.

In this sense, the PN like Labour before 2013, needs to promote candidates who resonate with the aspiration of its target group of voters; namely young and educated voters who are presently intent on not voting but whose votes the PN desperately needs to cut the gap.

But the PN can distinguish itself from Labour leader’s fan club, by creating a space where different values and opinions can co-exist while giving space to the party leader to set a clear direction. In this sense the PN cannot emulate Muscat’s playbook simply because it is by its very nature a coalition of disparate voters and MPs, whose loyalty to the leader is not unconditional.

And while Labour retains a progressive edge over the PN on a number of social issues, its super-majority makes it impossible to hold corruption, environmental degradation and abuse of power in check.

A coalition of enlightened conservatives and social liberals which only the PN can manage as it has done in the past, could well be the only obstacle left to another ‘super majority’ for Labour, which is debilitating for Maltese democracy.

For while a majority exists to keep Labour in power, the PN can still make a strong case for the need of a reinvigorated opposition which clips the wings of Labour’s super majority.

But the PN’s constant agony and inability to manage internal conflicts is actually making the prospect of a Labour landslide more likely. In this sense the PN risks demotivating a segment of its own traditional voters without winning over new voters appalled by the unhappy spectacle.