Echoes of 2017: From total war to a normal election?

Turn the clock back to May 2017, particularly to Joseph Muscat’s fiery speech on Workers’ Day when he called the election in the wake of the Egrant allegations, saying he would not allow “uncertainty to slow the rhythm of Malta’s economic miracle.”

Malta was in mid-coitus, gasping for breath in the wake of two enormous social revolutions – one in civil liberties which emancipated thousands of previously invisible citizens, and another with its over-development model, which turned many into “little rich people” as towns and villages were brutally disfigured. Despite being thrashed in 2013, Panamagate gave the PN the illusion that it could magically win back the people’s trust, with its anti-corruption battlecry short-circuiting its identity problem to give the impression it could restore the good old times.

In the end Muscat triumphed in a charged election which he called a year ahead of time to absolve himself from an unfounded allegation, Egrant, which had obscured the stark reality of the Panama companies owned by his close allies.

It was only after the election that revelations on 17 Black, Panama and Vitals and ultimately the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia exposed the rot that led to Muscat’s resignation and his replacement by Robert Abela, a political acrobat walking on a tight rope between continuity and change.

Five years on, the country is still struggling with Muscat’s contradictory legacy but the climate is decidedly different and the election a less do-or-die affair. So what are the main differences so far?

A foregone conclusion and questions about the super-majority

With polls showing a wide advantage for Labour, the result is a forgone conclusion with the only doubt being on whether Labour would retain its 2017 super-majority.

While polls also indicated a comfortable win for Labour in 2017, the drama of the election and expectations of a big reveal related to Egrant kept Nationalists hopeful till the last day, as did the party’s ability to fire up supporters with its anti-corruption battlecry. This ‘make believe’ ultimately backfired in the bitter disappointment after the election, but kept the party united behind Simon Busuttil all through the campaign.

The question now is not on whether Labour will win but by how much. This risks demoralising the PN, making it more vulnerable to defections and internal strife as seen in the first days of the campaign. And more of its pale blue voters could stay at home or vote for a third party or an independent like Arnold Cassola, but it also could make some pale red voters, especially those irked by local issues, complacent.

With the PN resigned to defeat, Grech could be under less pressure to deliver a miracle and focus more on regenerating his frontbench and proposals to address popular concerns.

In the end Muscat triumphed in a charged election which he called a year ahead of time to absolve himself from an unfounded allegation, Egrant, which had obscured the stark reality of the Panama companies owned by his close allies

Robert Abela’s bid for a strong mandate, similar to that of his predecessor, is keeping him on his toes and more vulnerable (and receptive) to the concerns of local communities, taken for-granted in 2017

Abela is defying history by aspiring for a super majority for a party which has already served two terms in power in a country which has seen parties either losing steam after a decade in power, like Labour did in 1981 when it lost its vote majority; and the PN in 1996 when it lost, and in 2008 which it won by a whisker.

But by replacing Muscat and pushing his own team, Abela is still in position to reverse this trend. By securing his own mandate Abela will be shedding the one he inherited from Muscat, possibly gaining enough strength to cleanse his party from the ugly side of his predecessor’s legacy.

But crucially, the prospect of a sure win, instead of making Abela complacent, is making him more receptive and vulnerable to pressure from local communities like those resisting a yacht marina in Marsaskala or council offices in a Marsaxlokk school garden. For Abela, every vote still counts as it also did in 2017 when Muscat used the power of incumbency to issue more planning permits and dish out jobs and promotions.

But the context has changed. Muscat banked on the feelgood factor captured by ‘the best of times’ motif. Abela is now expected to correct the excesses of his predecessor both in terms of governance and environmental issues. In this sense Muscat is now relegated to a ‘nuisance factor’, whose appearances risk upsetting Abela’s balancing act. And while a super-majority could result in a more powerful Labour government, the prospect of losing it in the next weeks is enough to make Abela more humble and prone to U-turns when faced with opposition in Labour’s own heartlands, where some may be tempted to abstain.

The PN has come up with a real manifesto which also responds to popular concerns, and is not focused on a single issue

Back in 2017, the PN’s manifesto was an afterthought with the party focusing all its energies on exposing the corruption in Castille. While this gave the party a battlecry, it left voters struggling with everyday realities cold. This time around the PN is focusing more on presenting its vision, and although its manifesto is long and in some cases too technical, it does identify the challenges faced by the country and address bread and butter issues like traffic (with its trackless tram proposal) and low income (with its albeit timid, living income proposal).

But Labour has the advantage of starting the race as the party best placed to actually implement its manifesto. And while the PN does come with a holistic vision of a new social pact, Labour’s neoliberal growth model still creates enough wealth to be dished out in targeted spending, tax cuts and grants to first-time buyers.

While it remains unlikely that the PN’s manifesto proposals on their own could reverse the trend, by presenting a cohesive manifesto the PN has gone some way in projecting itself as an alternative government. But to translate this into electoral gains, the PN still needs to convince voters that it has a strong frontbench able to implement it.

Abela and Grech are blander but less divisive figures than Busuttil and Muscat. The debate between the two remains one of the incognitos of the campaign

Muscat never avoided debates with Busuttil, including ones in which he did not play home, as was the case of a pre-election debate on the Egrant question in which he demolished the PN leader. In contrast so far, Abela has avoided a face-off with Bernard Grech in an indication that the PM felt that he had nothing to gain from such a debate, which would have put the two rivals on an equal footing.

But now that such a debate is inevitable and the pressure is fully on, Grech has to catch up by delivering crushing blows. He also has to appeal to voters who are tired of endless confrontation.

One key difference with 2017 is that despite harsh attacks from both sides, neither of the two contenders are questioning the democratic legitimacy of each other. For while in 2017 Busuttil found himself in the difficult situation of looking at the eyes of an adversary which his party’s billboards had placed behind bars, Grech has not crossed that line.

And while this may make the debate less exciting, it also gives the Opposition leader the opportunity to present himself as an alternative prime minister rather than an inquisitor.

Marlene Farrugia formed the Forza Nazzjonali coalition with Simon Busuttil

No coalitions this time around, but abstention and possibly a surprise on the third party front, which could be a major factor in determining the scale of Labour’s victory

One of the most interesting developments in the 2017 campaign was the PN’s decision to formalise a “coalition” with Marlene Farrugia’s Democratic Party. While this could have represented a more continental evolution in Maltese politics, it provided Labour the chance to lash out at the “coalition of confusion”.

And crucially it was the PD which ended up electing two MPs at the cost of the PN. In the long term this was a major setback for third-party politics because after becoming a pet hate for Labour, the Farrugia couple burnt any good will from the PN by later obstructing Adrian Delia’s leadership bid.

Rather than seeking any coalition, this time round the PN has come up with a bold proposal for electoral reform through which parties with at least 5% of the vote would get a seat, which would make real coalitions possible in the future. But while third parties like ADPD running on their own steam have so far failed to inspire voters, Cassola’s independent candidature on two districts – which are also PN strongholds – may have an impact on the result.

Cassola’s fortunes also depend on the polls. Any recovery by the PN may reinvigorate pale blue voters in a last attempt to deny Labour a super-majority. On the other hand, if Grech’s party does not turn things around in the campaign, these voters may be increasingly tempted to vote for someone they respect, with a solid track record which included campaigning for EU membership, a near successful bid for the European Parliament in 2005, and a consistent opposition to major development projects in both PL and PN times, and lately an obsessive focus on the ethical standards of Labour MPs.