[ANALYSIS] Five reasons the PN is not gaining from Labour’s losses: the data

The latest MaltaToday survey held amidst a surge in COVID-19 cases before a new quasi-lockdown set in, showed 13% of Labour voters intent on not voting. Yet, there has been no significant shift to the PN. This suggests that the Opposition is still struggling to translate growing dissatisfaction with Robert Abela’s mismanagement of a third pandemic wave into support for the PN. Why?

1. So far disillusioned Labour voters are showing their disillusionment by saying they will abstain, not vote PN

One major concern for Labour today is that it now registers a higher rate of abstention than the PN.

Compared to October 2020, the abstention rate within Labour’s voting base has shot up by 6 points. While 13% of PL voters in 2017 say they will not vote if an election is held now, 10% of PN voters in 2017 also say they will not vote. And the PN now retains higher percentage of voters from 2017 than Labour.

But this in itself may be good news for Labour: instead of shifting to the PN, disillusioned Labour voters are more likely not to vote. That abstention rate remains significantly high among younger and tertiary-educated voters, where in both categories nearly a third remain undecided or intent on not voting.  This explains why the PL media focuses so much on discrediting the opposition for its double standards and divisiveness. In this way it ensures that its own disillusioned voters remain parked among non-voters.

But the major stumbling block for the opposition among M.O.R. voters is the difficulty they find in perceiving the PN as a viable alternative government, a perception that can only be dispelled by generational change inside the party. Much now depends on Labour’s ability to lure these voters back. Bernard Grech’s offensive on COVID-19 may be in synch with the concerns of a large segment of voters but still needs to be accompanied by a compelling vision and team to implement it. 

2. The PN’s losses to Labour cancel out gains made from winning over 2017 Labour voters: the PN needs to understand why Labour is an attractive prospect to its own voters.

 While 5.1% of PL voters in 2017 say they will vote PN now, 4.3% of PN voters in 2017 will vote PL. In numerical terms this suggests that while 8,720 PL voters will now vote PN, 5,835 PN voters will now vote PL. So the PN’s gains among PL voters in the past election are still being partly offset by gains by Labour among the PN voters in 2017.

The inability to stop the haemorrhage to Labour at its worst moment in this third COVID wave, is definitely bad news for the PN. In this particular survey, Bernard Grech is even less popular than his party among 2017 PL voters (only 4.4% of PL voters in 2017 trust Grech more than Abela. On the other hand, 4.6% of PN voters in 2017 trust Abela). In a presidential style election, the shift between parties would practically cancel each other out.

One important consideration is whether Abela will increase his appeal among PN voters, by taking decisive action on corruption cases involving his predecessor’s administration and whether these will come at a cost among more traditional cohorts of Labour supporters.

3. The PN fails to make significant inroads among non-university educated voters, and in Gozo, which Labour won in 2013 and 2017

Under Grech the PN has recovered its support in the northern and north harbour regions, which include districts like the tenth, ninth and twelfth districts where the party has been historically dominant.  Compared to last October, the first MaltaToday survey after Grech was elected leader, the party has gained 8 points in the northern harbour districts which includes major urban centres like Sliema, Qormi and Birkirkara.

The bad news is that despite the PN’s focus on Gozo in the past months, Labour has consolidated its supremacy there. Compared to October, support for the PN in Gozo has dropped by 10 points. This may be an indication that Abela’s decision to appoint three ministers in his Cabinet hailing from Gozo has paid off. The party also failed to make any inroads in the western region, which includes a diversity of localities ranging from the more rural Siggiewi and Haz-Zebbug to the more affluent and urbanised Lija and Attard.

But in a sign that greater trust in Bernard Grech has still not resulted in gains for the PN, Grech is 9 points more popular than his party in the western region and 6 points more popular than his party. The latter result suggests that the PN may still need a strong candidature in the sister island which can garner the goodwill reaped by Grech. 

Despite still lagging behind Labour, the party has made significant gains in the southeast district, which includes Grech’s hometown Birzebbugia, where the party grew by 14 points since last October. This suggests that contrary to the perception fuelled by Labour that Grech represents the elitist faction in his party, he has made notable inroads in the southeast; but less so in the south harbour region which includes Cottonera. This is also reflected in gains for the party among the secondary educated (+11 points). In fact, the bad news for Labour is that in contrast to Simon Busuttil, Grech’s appeal is not restricted to the university-educated. Like Eddie Fenech Adami and Lawrence Gonzi he seems able to sway a segment of working-class voters. 

Moreover, Grech is significantly more popular than his party among secondary-educated voters (4 points); yet slightly less popular than his party among the tertiary-educated. 

In contrast to its gains among secondary-educated voters since October, the PN lost 7 points among the university-educated. Upon Grech’s election in October, support for the PN in this category peaked, registering a relative majority in a category which had fallen out of love with his predecessor Adrian Delia. But five months on, Labour has won back a narrow lead in this category amidst an increase in undecided voters, non-voters and third-party voters. This may indicate that this historically PN-leaning category, which had largely rejected Adrian Delia, may have not entirely warmed up to Grech. This may also reflect the party’s balancing acts on hunting and construction which may have alienated this segment.

The party also failed to make any inroads among respondents who continued their post-secondary studies but did not attend university where Labour retains its strong majority. This is one particular category which historically leaned towards the PN but which shifted to Labour after the 2008 election. In this particular category the party is now even less popular than it was last year.

4. Grech’s prudence liked by over-65s but he suffered in youth vote

Despite a 10-point increase since Grech became leader, the PN still faces an uphill struggle in the 16-35 bracket where Abela is decisively more popular than Grech. This may be offsetting gains among older voters where Grech seems to strike a chord.

While 28% of young voters aged 16-35 are intent on voting PN, only 25% trust Grech more than Abela. On the other hand, while only 33% say they will vote Labour, 36% prefer Abela to Grech. This means that while the gap between the parties in this bracket amounts to just 5 points, the gap between leaders increases to 11 points, in an indication that the PN may have less room for growth in coming months.

In contrast while Grech leads Abela by 3 points among over 65s, the PN still lags 6 points behind Labour. This suggests that the PN still has room to grow in this category.

Grech’s popularity among over-65s may contrast his unpopularity among the youngest age bracket, but reflects the generational divide between the more risk-averse elderly and carefree younger generations, frustrated by COVID restrictions. The events in the past days which have seen Abela sobering up in front of a surge in COVID numbers, may well change these dynamics and vindicate Grech’s more prudent approach. 

5. A spike in votes for ADPD penalised the PN more than the PL

After a long period of decline, the survey shows the ADPD party recovering some support reaching the 1.7-point mark which is close to AD’s best ever general election result in 2013.

Significantly support for the greens increases to 4.6% among the 16-35 bracket and to 5% among the tertiary-educated. The survey clearly shows that the increase in support for ADPD penalises the PN more than the PL.

This also raises the question on why a political formation which is clearly to the left of Abela’s Labour, fails to capitalise on Labour’s losses and evident signs of disillusion among the party’s more socialist elements.

While the PN loses 1.5% of its 2017 voters to the third party, the PL loses none of its voters to the centre-left outfit. Support for ADPD is also strongest in PN-leaning regions, particularly in the north where 4% will vote for the new party. But the greatest surprise is that ADPD, the only party opposed to the Gozo tunnel, registers its second-best result in Gozo where 2.7% would vote for it. This poses another problem for the PN which struggles in its balancing act on an issue on which its voters are split.