Divorce Majeur - the undoing of a serial election-winning coalition

In retrospect, anyone would think we were discussing some truly epochal, monumental issue: universal suffrage, for instance; or the abolition of slavery, a cause of civil war in other countries, times and climes.

But no. The whole brouhaha was in fact about divorce – i.e., the right to remarry after one’s previous marriage had broken down, a right so basic and widespread that it is taken for granted in all countries of the world but the Philippines… and even that country is now discussing its introduction.

And yet, this same issue not only plunged the entire country into its most visceral and divisive dilemma since the EU membership debate – pitting the country’s ecclesiastical authorities against a sizeable and increasingly vocal secular population, with bruising results for both sides – but it also ended up  arguably smashing the ruling Nationalist government into three discernable factions, with devastating consequences on its perceived legitimacy and electoral chances for the immediate future.

Gonzi ‘pwned’

For those less familiar with popular computer gaming parlance, Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi’s declared position against divorce has now been completely and thoroughly smashed to atoms. The referendum result not only established a clear majority in favour of divorce – which Dr Gonzi acknowledged immediately afterwards, though he unaccountably chose to defy that majority in parliament regardless – but it also spelt out a reality that Gonzi and his closest aides had studiously ignored for years.

Contrary to the impression forged by the PN’s media machinery since its inception in 1998, Nationalist voters are not foursquare behind the party leadership when it comes to matters of a religious versus secular nature. A close analysis of the referendum voting patterns amply illustrates that the Yes victory was secured not by Labour, but by PN voters – a fact which places Gonzi himself at loggerheads with a significant segment of his own party’s support-base.

The scenario becomes harder to comprehend when one considers how often this reality had been spelt out to Gonzi before the referendum. Not only was Gonzi warned directly that a Yes victory could spell the end of his career – with PN international secretary John Bonello drawing comparisons with Belgian PM Wilfred Martens, who resigned after unsuccessfully opposing an abortion bill in parliament – but prominent Nationalist media pundits practically shouted themselves hoarse trying to convince the party and its leader to change tack.

Especially significant were the repeated warnings – among others, by former PN minister (and Yes campaigner) Michael Falzon – that the PN risked compromising its own identity as a ‘broad church’ of conservative as well as liberal viewpoints, that had turned the party into a serial election-winning machine. 

Gonzi’s failure to heed any of this advice also exposed him to serious questions regarding his own leadership qualities – as did his remarkable strategic error of tying the entire Nationalist Party to an anti-divorce position, without first testing the waters to be certain of victory, and despite the fact that the bill had been presented by one of his own MPs.

Questions regarding Gonzi’s competence have multiplied exponentially following his equally remarkable decision to openly defy the majority in parliament.

At the time of writing, calls for his resignation are echoed even by some of erstwhile closest supporters. And yet, he has failed to make any form of public statement since his No vote last Wednesday. Divorce, it seems, has not only defeated the Prime Minister, but also stunned him to silence.

Labour’s gamble

While the ramifications have proved far more serious for the PN than for Labour, the party in opposition has also experienced internal backlashes of its own.

Divorce has in fact divided Labour for over a decade. In 1997, Prime Minister Alfred Sant took a leap in the dark by establishing a commission to explore the possible effects of divorce legislation… without any clear indication of how the matter stood with his own party’s supporters.

His government’s downfall the following year may not have been a direct consequence of this initiative; but it happened so fast that we never got an answer to the question of how the Labour party grassroots would react to the prospect of divorce being introduced ‘on their watch’.

Sant’s successor Joseph Muscat took a perhaps more direct line of approach: publicly declaring, in July 2010, that he would present a bill if elected Prime Minister. Again, he left the door ajar for a possible escape route, by allowing his MPs a free vote on the issue. But with Nationalist MP Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando sweeping the carpet from under his feet the following year, cracks quickly began to show in the party’s otherwise compact facade. Qormi heavyweight Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca campaigned against divorce ahead of the referendum, and abortively announced her resignation when faced with the result. Subsequently she softened her position, choosing to voice her dissent only by abstaining in the second reading. In the end, only Adrian Vassallo voted against the unofficial party line (see interview, page 20)… an action that Muscat has since claimed will have ‘consequences’ for the backbencher. 

But with Labour reaping so many dividends from the PN leader’s sheer intransigence on this one issue – first in the form of ‘Yes for divorce’ campaigner Deborah Schembri, and more recently in the ‘shock’ defection of Sliema councilor Cyrus Engerer – any haemorrhage the PL may suffer on account of its leader’s divorce gamble are likely to more than handsomely compensated in the long term.