[ANALYSIS] How Meloni’s victory could increase Malta’s migration woes

Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, who was Home Affairs Minister under the Gonzi administration, recalls with trepidation the squabbles with the Italian government of the time over migration and wrangling on who should take responsibility for saving lives. Now he warns that a government across the channel that is led by the hard-right could mean “a lot of time consumed in playing puerile games” over responsibilities for rescuing people whose lives are at risk.

He is convinced that if Giorgia Meloni becomes Italian prime minister, far-right leader Matteo Salvini will insist on getting the home affairs ministry. And he attributes this state of affairs to the “disappearance of the centre-right” which was largely supplanted at a national level by Meloni’s post-MSI party Fratelli d’Italia, and Salvini’s Lega.

Former foreign minister Evarist Bartolo also shares this sentiment, even if according him this outcome depends on whether Libya is able to contain the flows of migration emanating from its coast. “If Matteo Salvini becomes Interior Minister, Italy will take a tougher line on immigration,” Bartolo says, but he does not see Malta becoming inevitably “the weakest link on the EU’s southern borders” with the migration flow diverted from Lampedusa to Malta.

Giorgia Meloni

Bartolo, who as foreign minister focused on strengthening relations with Libya, thinks pressure will grow on Malta, but much also depends on the departure points of the outflow from Libya and “our indispensable cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guards”.

But Bartolo also contends that the only long term solution is a building a new relationship with the African continent. “It is in Malta and Italy’s and the EU’s common interest to remind other member states that by 2050, the 54 African countries will have a total population of 2.5 billion, mostly young people seeking jobs.

“Therefore it is in the interest of both neighbouring countries to work together on development, peace, climate change, energy, and ‘regular migration’ channels, as well as building new regional supply and value chains through near-shoring and a culture to create wealth and jobs for people not to have to migrate to seek a better life.”

Chronicles of a crisis foretold

Migration is surely one of the major planks of the Italian hard right which now dominates the alliance with the centre-right. While Salvini promises to reintroduce draconian security decrees and laws criminalising both asylum seekers and rescue missions, Meloni is proposing a “naval blockade” enforced by the European Union to stop all boat departures from Libya.

Yet it remains very doubtful whether such a measure will be endorsed by other member states, considering the implications on international law.

And while this could well be a slogan aimed at boosting electoral support in the battle for the dominance of the right, only to be toned down by the realities of governing a country firmly anchored in the European Union, any government led by Meloni or Salvini will inevitably have to give its electorate a piece of flesh.

In such a scenario, Meloni may well blame the EU for refusing the enforce the blockade and close Italian ports to migrants as had happened on previous occasions when the right was in government. This is bound to strain the country’s relationship with Malta.

In fact, historically cordial relations between Italy and Malta were only disrupted by stand-offs on migration which mostly occurred during the two periods during which Italy had shifted to the right: first during the Berlusconi government between 2008 and 2011, when the anti-immigrant Lega Nord was still a junior partner of the more mainstream Forza Italia; and in the brief populist interlude between 2018 and 2019, when Matteo Salvini was Minister for Home Affairs in an uneasy coalition with the 5 Star Movement (M5S)

Underlying the dispute between Malta and Italy was the latter’s insistence that Malta should take in all immigrants rescued in its search and rescue area.

This policy was reversed by Enrico Letta’s centre-left administration, which embarked on ‘Operazione Mare Nostrum’ with Italy taking responsibility over migration in the wake of tragedies which saw hundreds of migrants losing their lives at Lampedusa.

The policy was tweaked by successive governments led by Matteo Renzi and Paolo Gentiloni, who openly clashed with NGOs rescuing migrants on the sea after Mare Nostrum was discontinued. But Malta was still largely spared from boat arrivals between 2013 and 2018 as Italy backed off from squabbling with tiny Malta.

This period, which coincided with Joseph Muscat’s political ‘bromance’ with Matteo Renzi, was interrupted by the election of a populist coalition between the Lega and the M5S, in which Matteo Salvini served as foreign minister.

Once again Malta found itself on the receiving end of arrivals, relying on ad-hoc pacts between willing EU member states led by Emmanuel Macron’s France, to share responsibility over migrants stranded on the high sea during a number of stand-offs between Italy and Malta.

But this policy was partly reversed under subsequent coalitions, including the technocratic government led by banker Mario Draghi, who adopted a less hawkish approach despite the inclusion of Salvini’s hard-right in his coalition.

Fighting organised crime

Migration apart, both former Maltese ministers concur on the need of a closer relationship with Italy in combating organised crime.

Bartolo contends that Malta and Italy need a strong strategic partnership whoever is in government in both countries. “It should include cooperation in combating human trafficking and human smuggling from North Africa but would be myopic to restrict it to this area. We need to work together to fight all kinds of economic crime like tax evasion and money laundering.”

Moreover Malta and Italy should strengthen their collaboration in the framework of the Central Mediterranean Security Initiative to fight oil, arms, drug, medicine and waste trafficking that takes place in the Wild West of the Hurds Bank. “The fact that this area is beyond the national jurisdiction of both Italy and Malta makes cooperation against transnational crime more complicated,” he notes.

Mifsud Bonnici agrees, noting the risk posed by infiltration of organised crime in the economy. “We have a lot to learn from the Italian experience in fighting the mafia with appropriate legislation. We need to share the know-how and stronger cooperation between officials on both sides to contrast the presence of criminal elements which may thrive on economic growth but in the process erodes future legitimate investment.”

Mifsud Bonnici also notes the importance of concurrent regional elections in Sicily which are just as important for Malta as national elections in Italy, especially in view of the strong connection between the two islands in various sectors including energy. He expects sea connections linking Malta to Europe through Sicily to become crucial in view of increased air travel costs.

“Therefore Malta’s economic prosperity also depends on good roads and rail connections in Sicily.”

In this aspect, Mifsud Bonnici banks on the election of Renato Schifani, a former Christian Democrat and Forza Italia minister, who belongs to the more moderate wing of the coalition.

The Mediterranean dimension

And both former ministers insist on the need of Malta and Italy working together to push the Mediterranean and Africa further up the EU agenda.

“I feel that as one-third of EU member states (9 out of 27), the Mediterranean European countries are allowing the Eastern Neighbourhood and Indo-Pacific framework to dominate the EU agenda, to the detriment of our relationship with the Mediterranean and Sub Saharan Africa,” Bartolo said.

He warns that this “geopolitical vacuum” on the African continent “is allowing developments there not only to be without the EU but also against the EU”.

Mifsud Bonnici referred to the Mediterranean vision of Italian politicians like Aldo Moro, and notes that the Draghi government has strengthened its ties with France, recalibrating the balance of power in the EU and restoring Italian prestige as a global player.

He also expresses concern at growing instability in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Libya, warning that in the absence of a European and Mediterranean vision, there is a growing risk of Russian activity in these countries.

But according to Mifsud Bonnici, this depends on high-level dialogue, noting that personal contact between Maltese and Italian PMs was limited following the Muscat-Renzi bromance. “There have been very little high level contact in recent years and contact between Draghi and Abela was limited to meetings on the fringe of EU summits.”

Less Europe?

While not expecting any big rift between Italy and Europe, Bartolo does expect a Meloni-led government to oppose a more federal union.

A Meloni-led government, according to Bartolo, will “stress that the EU is an intergovernmental and not a federal union and that an important role remains for the decisions of sovereign states and that Brussels does not concentrate more power away from the capitals of Member States.”

He also thinks that this leaves room for “common ground” between the two nations. “We should find common ground on this as it is not in our interest to get absorbed in a one-size-fits all federal European Union. We should not be timid in asserting our national interest in the EU. Other Member States do that, even if they camouflage their posture.”

The contenders

The centre-left Democratic Party (PD) – a party rooted in both the euro communist and Christian democratic tradition (Letta himself started his militancy with the Christian Democrats) may still emerge as Italy’s largest party. The polls put it at par with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy.

But it has only managed to secure an agreement with the left, the greens and Emma Bonino’s More Europe movement. Bonino, a former foreign minister and tireless civil rights campaigner, stood out during her tenure in office for her focus on development goals in Africa.

The centre-left is united by a pledge to introduce a decent minimum wage and is distinctly more socially liberal, supporting the legalisation of cannabis and the granting of citizenship to children born in Italy. And while the centre-left is poised to lose, it may well recover a sense of purpose eroded by its involvement in ideologically disparate coalitions often led by technocrats like the bankers Mario Draghi and Mario Monti, which turned off many on the left from politics.

The populist M5S, which vaguely leans towards the left, has chosen to run on its own, thus avoiding an internal rift. The party had emerged as Italy’s lagest party in 2018 but has since then lost support after supporting three different coalition arrangements: first with the Lega, then with the PD and finally the transversal Draghi government.

Matteo Renzo, who back-stabbed compromise PM Enrica Letta in 2014 to become PM, and Carlo Calenda, who formed his own party after splitting from the PD, have now formed their own centrist alliance, possibly in the hope that cracks in the centre-right alliance may lead to a new iteration of the Draghi government. This coalition has made no remarkable progress in the polls but has attracted former exponents from Forza Italia, like Mara Carfagna.

On the right, the agreement between Meloni, Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi stipulates that in the advent of a right-wing victory, whoever of the three get most votes will become Prime Minister. Meloni was the only one of the three not to support the Draghi government and has seen support for her party increase by 18 points since 2018. On the other hand Salvini’s gamble to gain greater respectability by supporting the Draghi government has not paid off as his party lost more ground to Meloni.

The coalition is united by a promise to cut taxes and introduce a socially regressive flat tax, and the introduction of a presidential system of government.

The focus on migration gives the right-wing an easy narrative, which is simpler to communicate through memes and slogans, than the left’s more complex, intellectual and moral arguments.

But moderate elements in the centre-right are apprehensive on Meloni’s past sympathy for Vladimir Putin, whom she disowned after the invasion of Ukriane and her sovereignty positions.

Despite his misgivings on technocratic governments due to his firm belief in the need of a political mandate, Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici does not exclude a repeat of the Draghi experience as more moderate elements seek to clip the wings of extremists.

Who will win?

To win the election, a coalition needs a minimum of 201 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 104 seats in the Senate.

The number of MPs was drastically reduced from 630 in the Chamber and 315 in the Senate following a referendum in 2020.

A third of the seats in both chambers is elected through the first-past-the-post system, with which wider coalitions have an advantage, while the rest are elected through proportional representation with a 3% treshold.

The latest polls suggest that the right-wing coalition is on track of winning 245 seats in the chamber and 127 seats in the senate, a result which would ensure it a workable majority. But that would depend on the right wing coalition retaining its unity.