A tragedy written in concrete

1. Forged documents

During the magisterial inquiry, a calligraphy expert noted discrepancies in the handwriting on the commencement notice for the works in Kordin.

The licensed mason on the site of the works was supposed to be a certain John Muscat. However, it was established that he had not signed the commencement notice himself, and that his signature on the notice was forged by Matthew Schembri.

In Malta, construction works cannot start without a formal commencement notice submitted to the Planning Authority after receiving clearance from the Building Construction Authority. This notice must be signed by a mason who assumes responsibility of the site.

Moreover, Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar did not appoint a licensed mason, or anyone with the equivalent technical expertise, to lead the works on site. They also did not notify the OHSA of the works.

Since there was no appointed supervisor as required by law, the responsibilities of the supervisor were assumed to be held by Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar as directors of AllPlus Ltd.

2. Structural deficiencies were root cause of collapse

There were major deficiencies in the structural design of the building in Kordin, and it was these deficiencies that led to the collapse of the building at such a detrimental scale.

One of the main indications of this is that the building collapsed outwards, rather than inwards. Since the outside structure was not ‘tied’ together properly, pressure from the overlying concrete planks pushed the walls outwards.

Photos exhibited in the inquiry show that the planned double walls were not tied together – a shortcoming of structural significance as a double wall tied together is four times stronger than two walls built next to each other.

Other photos show that the metal bars over which concrete is laid were neither tied to the respective adjacent structures, thus reducing the building’s ‘resilience’ in the case of an accident.

The inquiry also points to a spreader beam mentioned in the construction plans drawn up by the architect. However, what was missing were instructions for the spreader beam to be tied to the metal bars between the concrete planks.

There was no interlocking system tying the walls to other parts of the structure, so the moment one wall started to collapse, the whole site was going to go down with it.

3. Sofia’s last photo

One of the last photos snapped by Jean Paul Sofia – eerily reproduced in poor quality in the published magisterial report – shows that the workers were on the roof of the construction site at the time of the collapse. It shows four workers on site applying concrete to the roof.

Sammy Curtis, one of the workers injured in the collapse, said that he was operating the ‘ready-mix’ at the time of the accident. Another worker, Boris Cutajar, was manning the concrete pump on the roof when he looked behind him and saw part of the building collapse.

“I ran and held to the pipe of the pump. I was with four other foreign workers,” he said.

4. Architect’s personal assets

Adriana Zammit, the architect in charge of the construction works, transferred a substantial amount of money and property to third parties one month after the fatal collapse.

Chats referred to in the magisterial inquiry indicate that the architect started transferring unspecified but substantial sums of money and immovable property to third parties. The chats were between Zammit and a certain “Christian” from 3 January 2023 onwards.

Additionally, the chats indicated that Zammit was looking to dispose of her money.

The magistrate said that this alone does not constitute a crime in and of itself. However, it was noted that this fact could be relevant in the future, particularly in the eventuality that Zammit’s creditors come knocking for their dues.

The inquiry notes that in the future, this behaviour could be investigated since Zammit’s efforts to transfer personal assets could indicate plans to commit fraud.

5. Fast track permitting for factories

In her report, the magistrate observed that the fast-tracked planning procedure for the construction of factories in industrial sites is an “institutional choice” which creates a perception that few controls are required.

“[It] strengthens the perception that there is no need for many controls in the construction of factories where many people are employed,” the court expert observed.

The Planning Authority (PA) is not responsible for the safety aspect which falls under the scrutiny of the Building and Construction Authority but the inquiry suggests that the fast-track procedure contributes to laxity in the sector.

Factories in State-owned industrial estates do not need a full PA permit but are approved through a notification system in a shorter timeframe, and in the absence of public hearings and a case officer report.

According to this procedure instead of applying for a permit, developers are obliged to notify the Authority prior to the commencement of any work.

In the Kordin factory case the development was originally approved in April 2020, less than a month after the notification was presented.