No election, no majority, no party: what’s next?

Gonzi the procrastinator

In his speech on Thursday, Lawrence Gonzi underlined his readiness to humiliate himself in the national interest. Although one can easily substitute the words national interest with self-preservation - depending on one's perspective - Gonzi has showed remarkable tact in keeping his government afloat despite the constant troubles he faced. 

Still, through his delaying tactics he risks fatally undermining his political stature as he steers from one crisis to the next one without finding any final resolution.

But the Prime Minister has always found a way to survive through the use of a variety of tactics ranging from appeasement to political concessions.

One such measure was the appointment of backbenchers to the role of parliamentary assistants. Another was the decision to grant a free vote on the divorce referendum motion, which led to a victory for the opposition.

But this time round Gonzi faced a backbencher (Franco Debono) that pushed him to the brink by raising the stakes to the highest possible level - that of asking for the Prime Minister's resignation.

Gonzi was faced with a dilemma; either to call the MPs bluff or to find a way to appease him or tame him.  After an attempt to force Debono to resign proved counter-productive, the rebel backbencher was showered with the love of party stalwarts like Edwin Vassallo.

In the end, Gonzi chose to humiliate himself again, avoiding a showdown with the rebel backbencher which would have irked him further and thus avoid a worst case scenario: of being pushed in to an election which he had little hope of winning.

But although Gonzi has survived a vote, he is still hostage to the whims of Franco Debono. Neither did he manage to convince Debono to vote in favour of the government, which was the only way through which Gonzi could exorcise instability.  Actually, Gonzi emerges weakened by relying on the Speaker's casting vote, which creates the impression that his government is moribund and relies on the 'life support' of the speakers' casting vote. 

So far, Gonzi could blame the instability on Franco Debono and the opposition, which presented the no confidence vote. But now the ball is back in Gonzi's court. Any further ramblings on the backbench will simply exacerbate the climate of uncertainty in the country. 

While it is still possible that Gonzi still thinks that he can steer his ship in the troubled seas right up to the end - to ensure that projects like City Gate see the light before 'judgement day' - in so doing, he risks seeing his economic and fiscal accomplishments being blown away by political uncertainty for which he can no longer blame Muscat and Debono.

Still, there are some silver linings in the crisis for Gonzi. Apart from the advantage of postponing the general election, anticipation of an early general election has galvanised the Nationalist grassroots into election. It has also helped the party to close ranks around the leader. Interestingly, polls show that although Gonzi still lags behind Muscat, he enjoys a greater degree of trust than he enjoyed in 2008.

Ironically, the party could also find ways of turning an electoral liability into an asset. If it tries to bring Debono back into the fold by championing his reforms, the PN could project itself as a party that could bring about change if elected back into power.

One sure thing is that the party cannot afford to contest on the GonziPN formula because Gonzi's own stature has been diminished, and also because Labour is emulating the same strategy with a new leader. 

By delaying the election by a few months or weeks, the PN could manage to regroup and re-invent itself as a "team" rather than a Gonzi fan club. But will this be enough to make up for the damage done in the past years coupled with the fact that a single party has been in power for nearly a quarter of the century?

Another consequence of the delaying tactics would be that the country would still face local elections before general elections. For the PN this would be a chance to test the waters and to exhaust the opposition. The party will also have access to the list of disgruntled PN voters who vent their anger by abstaining.  But while it makes sense to give local elections their due course rather than having them overshadowed by national elections, such a decision would raise questions on the financial sense of holding a local election when a general election is still looming on the horizon.

Muscat bruised

When Franco Debono publically declared that he had no confidence in Lawrence Gonzi's government, Joseph Muscat had two options; either to let the situation drag on and let the PN implode in its contradictions or to push things to the brink by calling a no confidence vote. 

Had he embarked on the first path, he would have risked losing a favourable moment in which polls showed his party holding an insurmountable advantage of between 6 and 9 points over the PN and a 6 to 7 percentage swing from the PN. He also risked being perceived as being too moderate by his core supporters, who cannot wait for the moment they see the PL in power again after decades in the political wilderness.

But in so doing, he would have left the ball in the Prime Minister's court rather than given him the chance to blame the instability on the opposition. Moreover, by embarking on the second more courageous but risky path, he risked raising expectations of Labourites while banking on the support of a maverick like Franco Debono. The defeat may well have had demoralising effect on those who were already seeing Muscat in Castile by the end of March. The glum looks on Labour MPs' faces spoke volumes about the sense of disappointment among MPs.

Ironically, by setting his electoral machine in motion, he also contributed to a closing of ranks in the Nationalist Party and to galvanise a dormant Nationalist core. By unofficially launching his electoral campaign in last week's general conference, Muscat also risked giving away his cards too early by presenting some of his star candidates. Muscat now risks becoming predictable while the PN may well play its own trump cards when the real campaign starts.

His decision to press on for the vote also exposed a trait in his character, emblemised by his 1998 advice to Sant - that it is better to live a day like a lion than hundred days as a sheep.

Yet on previous occasions - like the divorce referendum - Muscat had shown remarkable caution.

This raises the suspicion that Muscat was either misled by Franco Debono's contradictory declarations (after all at one point Debono indicated that he would vote for the motion) or he genuinely believed that any outcome from the motion would be beneficial for his party. 

In fact, Muscat insists that he only presented the motion after repeatedly calling on Gonzi to present one himself after Debono called on Gonzi to resign. Despite his failure to bring the government down, Muscat has exposed a fundamental weakness in the government; the fact that as things stand, Gonzi does not enjoy a majority in parliament. As long as Debono is not brought back into the government's fold, Muscat will have a point in questioning the legitimacy of the government. And this time round, he does not have the ball in his court.

Still, Muscat's parallel with 1981 is questionable. While he has in point in distinguishing between strict constitutional legality (which Labour invoked in 1981) and the moral imperative (which the PN invoked in 1981 and Muscat invokes now), Muscat risks touching a raw nerve. For while in 1981 the opposition had a majority of votes but a minority of seats, the present government is still legitimated by a relative majority of votes gained in the last general election.  

Is Franco Debono toast?

Judging by the comments on social network sites, Franco Debono's honeymoon with Labour voters is over. While many Labourites expressed their admiration for the rebel MP when he was lashing at Gonzi, all the love evaporated the moment he announced his abstention. It seems that, for many Labourites, Debono was merely an instrument in the ultimate aim of getting back to power, rather than a politician promoting reforms.

On the other side of the divide, Debono's antics have earned him the reputation of an untrustworthy renegade. Still, by abstaining Debono has saved himself from being condemned as a turncoat. 

Middle-of-the-road voters have so far been ambivalent about the rebel MP. While many agreed with the reforms he championed, many questioned his lack of proportion, by making the resignation of the Prime Minister a condition for supporting government. Others who admired his lone stance against the party machine ended up asking: why did Debono waste three weeks of our life?

Surely, by abstaining Franco Debono has remained in the limelight. He still remains a potential kingmaker, having the full power to bring the government down in any future money bill. He also has the chance to push forward his private members' bill on party financing while retaining his power to make life hell for the government by intervening in parliamentary debates. Debono has already offered a glimpse of this by intervening in question time supporting the opposition's request for the accounts of public corporations. This is reminiscent of Dom Mintoff's vote against the setting up of the Malta Tourism Authority in the immediate aftermath of the Cottonera marina vote. Had Debono voted for the opposition's motion, he would have been condemned to oblivion, unable to contest again the election and losing the only platform he presently has. Had he voted against the opposition's motion, he would have lost his bargaining chips with the government. As long as the government covets his vote, Debono remains one of the most powerful men in the country. 

He might use this power to further humiliate the government or to press on with the reforms he champions. If he follows the latter course, democracy will be the ultimate beneficiary of the crisis. For it is extremely unlikely that, irrespective of which of the two parties is elected in government, there will be a political will to enact these reforms. If his intentions are to further humiliate the government, Gonzi will have no choice but to call an election. But by holding the entire country at ransom, Debono could further undermine his
reputation as a serious politician.