Analysis | Gonzi and the national interest
Lawrence Gonzi invoked the national interest against the prospect of a premature election, but then asked his own party to confirm his leadership. So whose interests this serves: the party’s, the country’s, or that of Gonzi himself?
Franco Debono cornered? | A plebiscite for Gonzi | Gate-keeping party | The national interest
Instead of offering a way forward on how to bring Franco Debono on board - and thus recompose a parliamentary majority which no longer exists - on Sunday Lawrence Gonzi announced his decision to present himself as a candidate in an unprecedented internal leadership contest that nobody - not even Debono - had asked for.
Gonzi's announcement was the highlight of an otherwise uneventful party general council, whose sobriety was underlined by a drab choreography which sharply contrasted with the Labour Party's more triumphal council the previous week.
So instead of choosing between the two realistic scenarios in front of him - a general election or a re-composition of his majority through an agreement with Debono - Gonzi has opted for an internal loyalty test which he is sure of winning.
What is most awkward in all this is that what happens in the party has little bearing on what will happen in parliament. For while Gonzi has tied the fortunes of the country to a test of loyalty in his leadership, ultimately the fate of his government depends on how Debono will vote in parliament in the next money bill.
Although the 'leadership contest' may not affect parliament, it does address Debono's main demand: Gonzi's resignation.
So by submitting his leadership to the verdict of the councillors, Gonzi is also asking the party to express themselves on Debono's most controversial demand.
Faced with the confirmation of Gonzi as party leader, Debono will have to choose between loyalty towards the party's highest and most democratic organ, and sticking to his personal convictions.
In this way, the conflict between Gonzi and Debono will be turned into one between the entire party and Debono: cornering and completely isolating the backbencher if he does not accept Gonzi's leadership.
The options for Debono are now clear - either burn all bridges with the party by sticking to his guns, or accept the verdict of the councillors which will certainly confirm Gonzi in his post.
But Debono may well reiterate his position that since he has already submitted his resignation from the party, he is not bound by its decisions. Moreover, he has not been calling for Gonzi's resignation from party leader, but from the post of Prime Minister (technically these two can be occupied by different people).
So Debono may well say that he is not interested in the contest called by Gonzi as party leader because his challenge was that of an MP against his Prime Minister.
It is only if Debono submits himself to the will of the PN councillors, that the "leadership contest" can have a bearing on the parliamentary stalemate.
In the absence of any agreement binding both Gonzi and Debono to the decision of the party councillors, Gonzi's decision to invoke a leadership contest is simply a political and strategic decision. Surely Debono is politically cornered, but how strategically wise was Gonzi's decision to call for a two-month long leadership contest?
The likely outcome of the contest is a plebiscite of votes for Gonzi.
There is little doubt that this contest will simply serve to prove - without a doubt - that Gonzi is the undisputed leader of the party. Despite his promise that he will accept the outcome of the contest if the party votes for someone else, such a promise is hollow in the absence of other candidates standing up against him.
Surely Gonzi is not preventing anybody from standing against him. But the timing and circumstances of the contest makes it extremely unlikely that a real contest takes place.
The likelihood of any candidate stepping forward is remote, not only because of the proximity of a general election and Gonzi's power of incumbency as Prime Minister, but also because any contestant would burn his future aspirations to lead the party by appearing disloyal to the present leader now.
It is also likely that the rank and file will regard anyone standing against Gonzi as untrustworthy.
Even procedurally, the contest is vitiated by the fact that Gonzi has not formally resigned from the post of party leader before announcing himself as a candidate in the eventual contest. For how can the party have a fair contest if the incumbent holds on to the post right up to the last day?
Interestingly, when Labour was having its leadership contest in 2008, the Nationalist media backed George Abela's proposal for a vote among all party members instead of party delegates. This prompts the question: why doesn't the party take its own advice and take the vote to party members? Surely in this case there can be no greater legitimacy for the new leader than that granted by party members.
Once again the party is being asked to act as a gatekeeper for the leadership in time of need. Instead of being vigilant on government when it was still in time to avoid strategic mistakes like the honoraria saga, the party has relegated itself to solving the leadership's problems.
This has already happened when the government was faced by a no-confidence vote in Austin Gatt and when faced by Debono's announced abstention, the party's executive was asked to discuss the way forward. Even in the divorce issue, the party was only brought in when the Prime Minister had already committed himself to a referendum.
In his speech Gonzi invited party members to criticise his leadership but he has so far failed from bringing back to the fold those ostracised because of their criticism.
Rather than rising above the leader to seek the best outcome for the party, the Nationalist Party is once again being asked to do the leader's bidding by embarking on a contest which can only have one logical outcome: a plebiscite for Gonzi.
While such a result will probably galvanise the enthusiasm of the core vote, it could further underline the association between Gonzi and the PN, thus thwarting any prospect of the party contesting the next election as a team instead of a Gonzi fan club as was the case in 2008. This could be counter productive in winning back voters who do not trust Muscat, prefer the PN's policies to Labour's, but have lost faith in Gonzi's style of government.
This does not mean that Gonzi does not remain an asset for the PN. In fact surveys show that Gonzi still remains more popular than his own party. Ironically Franco Debono's challenge to his leadership has even made him more popular among core voters. But it is also clear that Gonzi has lost his appeal among floating voters.
Moreover the party could be doing itself a disservice by throwing all its eggs in one basket rather than projecting itself as party led by Gonzi but also by a team which includes a couple of rising stars which would eventually take his place while ensuring that he will not make the same mistakes.
Another risk for the party is that the leadership contest would consolidate Gonzi's hold in the party to the extent that it will even be difficult to remove him, even in the case of electoral defeat.
But the leadership contest could also serve another purpose; that of buying time for the party to prepare for an imminent election. The fact that the contest will take two full months means that the party will surely try to postpone an election during this period, even if Debono can still bring the government down any time.
Yet while this could be valuable time for the party to regroup and set its electoral machine in motion, it could also confirm the impression that Gonzi is clinging to power.
While up until last week the party could have blamed the Opposition - and Debono - for the uncertainty created by the prospect of an early election, by failing to come up with a resolution to its parliamentary problems, Gonzi will be blamed for contributing to even more uncertainty and instability in the country.
For while Gonzi has invoked the national interest when stating that a general election now is not in the country's best interest in a time of economic crisis, he seems to overlook the fact that by procrastinating he could also be imperilling the national interest.
If the country gets bogged down in political uncertainty, Gonzi risks undermining his best accomplishment so far; that of keeping the economy afloat amidst the worst international economic crisis since the second world war.
While many may have agreed with Gonzi that an early election is clearly not the solution to the country's problems - as suggested by the opposition - the same people may feel equally frustrated by the instability created by the PM's procrastination. For these people, in the absence of Debono returning to the fold, an election now would be a lesser evil when compared to months of instability.
For while it is a matter of fact that the opposition failed in bringing the government down, it is also a self evident truth that the government has lost its majority. So if nothing changes in parliament, while there are no numbers to bring the government down, there are still no numbers to ensure that the country is governed properly.
The legitimacy of the government will be diluted if parliamentary democracy is crippled by the lack of a clear majority on the government's side. Moreover, if prolonged, this state of affairs could result in a situation where the whole legislative process is crippled.
It is also becoming increasingly difficult to determine whether Gonzi is interested in self-preservation or in the national interest, or whether these two factors have become indistinguishable in the PM's frame of mind.
In fact, by trying to find a solution to the parliamentary crisis by resorting to a plebiscite in his party, Gonzi risks further undermining the distinction between his interest and the national interest.
Ultimately in this case it is far from clear whether Gonzi's interest coincides with that of his party, let alone with that of the country.
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