[ANALYSIS] Gonzi’s election dilemma: autumn or spring?

Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi hinted last Sunday at further disciplinary action against the rebel backbenchers whom he accused of crossing a red line by voting with the opposition to undermine government. In so doing, he has fuelled talk of an autumn election called immediately after the summer recess, possibly to be announced during the party's independence celebrations in September.

But the prime minister may still be weighing the pros and cons of calling an election after the summer recess, thus avoiding the need to present a budget, or to hang on to power till spring next year.

A budget acid test

The prospect of holding onto power till spring 2013 will require the government to present a difficult budget, where political manoeuvring would be seriously limited by the scrutiny of the EU Commission in the wake of a euro-zone crisis which could be further aggravated as more countries are pushed to the brink of a bailout.

Two successive quarters of no growth also dealt a fatal blow to the optimistic projections in last year's budget.

With Malta now technically in a recession, the government has already revised its growth target for this year from a highly optimistic 2.3% to a more realistic 1.5%: which means less fiscal revenue for government this year, and thus less ability to spread the wealth before the election.

In fact an inability to present a positive pre-electoral budget could well push the prime minister to adopt a tougher line with the backbenchers who would get the blame for making it impossible for him to keep on governing, and thus provide him with the perfect alibi for calling an election before the budget. 

Budget considerations apart, blaming the backbenchers for an interruption of the present legislature, will provide Gonzi with an alibi to avoid difficult choices on other controversial issues.

On the other hand, if the economy springs back from recession thanks to a successful trend in tourism, Gonzi would surely not miss the opportunity of presenting an upbeat budget which would underline his government's success in weathering the international storm. 

Although the prospect of buying votes through a fiscal pre-electoral bonanza seems to be out of the question in the prevailing difficult circumstances, even minor and targeted fiscal benefits would confirm the perception that the country is doing much better than many other European countries resorting to austerity measures.

Therefore this would suggest that the party will still seek the vote of the backbench rebels to get its budget approved. 

The JPO factor

One risk in this strategy is Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando's unpredictability.  The Zebbug MP has already shown an ability to mislead Gonzi into believing that he would toe the line on the Richard Cachia Caruana motion: going as far as to mislead Cachia Caruana himself in a private meeting.

Added to this was the highly symbolic step by the Labour party to provide free security services to the rebel Nationalist MP: a step which amplifies the popular perceptions collusion between Labour and the rebel MP.

Ironically this makes it easier for Lawrence Gonzi to rally support for drastic measures against the MP if he really wants to go for an election after the summer recess. But it also makes cohabitation with the rebel MP more difficult.

Settling scores

Parliament's summer recess also offers the prime minister time to deal with internal dissent without risking any reverberations on his fragile one-seat majority. 

The summer recess gives him the comfort zone of being in control of his own destiny, allowing him to decide between two options: either push the backbenchers to the brink, then use their inevitable reaction as an alibi to call a pre-budget election; or else to keep on admonishing the MPs to appear tough, without taking any decisive action which would justify their withdrawal of support after the summer recess.

So far, all three rebel MPs have declared their intention to continue supporting the government. Therefore the only way to push any of the three MPs to withdraw their support for government is by expelling them from the party on the basis of their role in bringing down Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici or Richard Cachia Caruana: a step which would effectively mean the party losing its one-seat majority.

Pullicino Orlando's warning on Wednesday, that the cost of his expulsion would be an early election, suggests that any drastic action against the rebel MPs during the summer break would probably result in an autumn election. Theoretically, expulsion from the party of any one sitting MP would effectively mean that the party would have lost its majority in parliament. But technically, the government would still have to lose a vote of confidence or money bill to actually lose power. 

Still, Gonzi may well avoid going to parliament altogether:  calling an election before the House is even reconvened, on the pretext that he is not being allowed to govern by the 'gang of three'.

In this way, by expelling the MPs Gonzi would be denying himself the majority and make an election inevitable - a curious path of action for a party currently trailing at the polls.

The prime minister has so far not ruled out the expulsion of the three rebels. But on Thursday the Times of Malta quoted "party sources" saying that they saw no need and did not intend to expel the three MPs, adding that there were other ways to convey a message".

This suggests that Gonzi could be seeking a way of appearing tough without pushing the rebels to the brink: an indication that in the ongoing chess game with the three backbenchers, Gonzi could still be considering his moves; pushing for an expulsion if he wants an election... but taking a more cautious path if he wants to present another budget.

The spectre of defeat

But with the party trailing behind Labour by more than 10 points, many could be wary of pushing things too far, and may well advise Gonzi to hold on till the end of his mandate.

Interviewed last week, veteran MP Francis Zammit Dimech admitted that calling an election now is the "biggest temptation on many people's minds at this moment in time". But he also questioned whether "this is most responsible course of action", pointing out the delicate situation of the eurozone crisis, and how the present government has managed to weather the storm.

Another factor is whether Gonzi himself believes that an election is winnable, irrespective of whether it is held in autumn or spring. 

If Gonzi has lost hope of winning, he may well be tempted to hold on to the reins of power to get the historical credit of opening new projects and taking strategic decisions which would condition the next government. For much the same reason, he might also be tempted to throw in the towel and go down fighting in a display of bravado ahead of an election in October.

One other major consideration will be pressures from ministers bidding for re-election who would like to preserve their place in parliament even if Labour is elected. These are probably the least enthusiastic about calling an election in autumn, as this would deprive them of the mileage they could derive from opening new projects before an election is actually called.

At the end of the day, the choice may also be dictated by how much ammunition the PN has to use in the electoral campaign. In the absence of any startling knock-out revelation which could fatally dent popular trust in its leader during an intensive autumn campaign, a spring election still seems to be a more logical course of action for the PN.

But this ultimately depends on the government's ability to present a budget without having to resort to austerity. If this turns out to be impossible, expect an escalation with the rebel MPs in the next weeks and an election in autumn.