In 2012 | Gonzi: Surviving against all odds

Lawrence Gonzi was definitely the best asset the party had before the 2008 general elections. Polls showed that while Labour had a 6 to 8 percentage point lead over the Nationalist Party, Gonzi was consistently more trusted than Labour leader Alfred Sant.

This reasoning prompted party strategists to come up with the GonziPN formula, which effectively turned the 2008 election into a presidential contest, pitting Gonzi against Sant.

To some extent, presidential contests were not a novelty in Malta - with the PN using the 'Eddie Fiducja' slogan in 1992 - but never was the identification between leader and party so direct. Another difference was that Eddie Fenech Adami's strong leadership coexisted with equally strong party structures.

GonziPN was accompanied with concrete steps to recompose the hegemonic block, which over the years had turned the PN in to a sort of 'natural party' of government.

Gonzi addressed middle class discontentment through promises of tax cuts and a MEPA reform presided by himself.

But this project was immediately shot down by the global economic crisis, which robbed the government of its ability to win consent through substantial tax cuts in the first years of this administration. There was barely time to celebrate before Gonzi had to confront the aftermath of the Mistra scandal. 

Subsequently, his leadership was constantly undermined by his one-seat majority and his failure to keep his parliamentary group united behind him - which led to the PN leader being embroiled in one crisis after another.

Following the 2008 election, Lawrence Gonzi took the drastic decision of appointing a lean government composed of eight ministers instead of the 13 Ministers he had between 2004 and 2008. But the demotion of former ministers like Jesmond Mugliett - who got to know they were not chosen via SMS - contributed to backbench unrest in later years.

For the clouds had been gathering on the horizon for years. From Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando's objections to the St John's Co-Cathedral extension, through the approval of an opposition motion proposing the wording of the divorce referendum to Franco Debono's first signs of disenchantment by his no-show in parliament, Gonzi was forced to fend off crisis after crisis.

A discontented backbench eventually led Gonzi to create the new but vague post of parliamentary assistant in an attempt to bring backbenchers like Debono back in line.

Surely, despite these internal troubles, prime minister Lawrence Gonzi stood out as a statesman in the international arena during the Libyan crisis and has so far managed to steer Malta away from the worse ravages of the eurozone crisis and to restore vitality in a number of economic sectors, like tourism. 

But these two notable accomplishments have been obscured by two self-inflicted mistakes; namely the secrecy surrounding the honoraria saga and the divorce vote in parliament, in which Gonzi ended up voting in a way which contradicted the will of the electorate.

Although Gonzi has backtracked on the honoraria issue by restoring ministers' pay to pre-2008 levels, public trust was already dented by the secrecy in which the salary revision was conducted, which was further aggravated by the timing of a pay increase benefiting Gonzi and his ministers in a time of crisis.

The divorce issue was another self-inflicted quandary, since it was the PN leader who first proposed a referendum to resolve the issue, only to refuse to respect its outcome when he personally voted on the bill in parliament.

Moreover, Gonzi's arithmetic calculus, between saving his conscience and assuring a parliamentary majority for the new divorce bill, left a bitter taste among those who expected him to simply rubberstamp the referendum result.

These self-inflicted mistakes dented Gonzi's ability to give leadership to the country at a time when international circumstances dictate inevitable economic and fiscal hardships.

Moreover, Joseph Muscat proved to be a more formidable opponent than many Nationalist pundits had anticipated, emulating the PN's own 'GonziPN' stratagem from the opposition and attracting a motley crew of former Nationalists on his winning cart.

Navigating a crisis

Although Gonzi ended the year by losing the budget vote on 10 December, he managed to avoid a 2012 election by wading the waters of a year-long political crisis ushered in by Franco Debono's abstention in a no-confidence motion in Austin Gatt back in November 2011.

Unlike Alfred Sant in 1998, who tied a vote on a yacht marina to a confidence vote in his government, Gonzi resisted calling Franco Debono's bluff by turning the various votes taken through the year into confidence votes, while surviving actual votes and confidence he called.

This came at a huge price: the loss of a minister and a high-ranking ambassador and political ally.

Banking on Franco Debono's unwillingness to bring the government down after Debono abstained in a government confidence vote presented by the Labour opposition in January, Gonzi managed to navigate his way through explosive parliamentary minefields, successfully surviving till the summer recess.

The second major test for his government after the January vote was the passing of the budget implementation bill, which was approved with Franco Debono's vote in May.

But Debono's vote came at a price, as the government had to accept setting a date for the opposition's motion of censure in then home affairs minister Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici.

To buy time, Gonzi ended up suffering the humiliation of seeing government defeated in two motions of censure presented by the opposition, one voted by Debono and another by Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, which saw the political decapitation of Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and Malta's permanent representative to the EU, Richard Cachia Caruana.

It was only in the safety of the summer recess, when he faced no risk of a parliamentary revolt, that Gonzi proceeded to show his muscle against the three rebel backbenchers responsible for his parliamentary defeats.

All three were banned from contesting with the party in the next election. Yet this did not prevent Gonzi from further undermining his authority by entering a coalition pact with newly independent MP Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando who resigned from the party after it failed to expel Cachia Caruana.

Debono was simply ignored, with Gonzi intent on continuing to play the blame game with Debono based on the latter's reluctance on bringing the government down while doing everything possible to force Gonzi to call an election himself.

To reach this aim after the summer, Debono embarked on a rampage, presenting a motion of censure in Austin Gatt and threatening to do the same with regards to health minister Joe Cassar.

Having survived the summer, Gonzi's mission was that of surviving till budget day - the next confidence test for his government.

But he wanted to do so without losing another member of his Cabinet. He managed to do so thanks to a Speaker's ruling based on anachronistic parliamentary rules which give the government of the day control of the House Business Committee, which sets the agenda of parliament.

In this way, he was able to rule out a vote of confidence in Austin Gatt before the budget - enabling Gonzi to navigate his way to a showdown with Debono in the budget vote.

Therefore, Gonzi did not have to sacrifice Austin Gatt to achieve this aim, as he had to do with home affairs minister Carm Mifsud Bonnici and permanent representative to the EU Richard Cachia Caruana.

Still, the Speaker's own reservation on the fairness of parliament's standing orders spoke volumes of Gonzi's failure to redress Malta's democratic deficit.

For ironically, the government managed to survive on borrowed time thanks to standing orders whose fairness has been questioned by Frendo himself, a former minister and PN stalwart.

Subsequently, Gonzi cornered Debono, giving him no option but to vote against the government in the budget by refusing Debono's call for Austin Gatt's resignation from Cabinet.

Ironically it was Gonzi himself who, back in January, had proposed Gatt's departure from Cabinet to lead the party's electoral machine. But giving in to Debono's demands at such a late stage would have undermined Gonzi's authority.

Curiously, had the government accepted the opposition's request for an urgent debate on Franco Debono's motion of no-confidence in Austin Gatt, the government may well have secured Debono's vote in the budget.

For Debono has repeatedly linked his vote on the budget to the permanence of Austin Gatt in the Cabinet.

Still, the loss of another minister would have seriously undermined Gonzi's authority during an electoral campaign, which has already started.

It would have also given the impression that Debono can hold the government at ransom, undermining Gonzi's authority at a time when he needs to assert it to galvanise his electorate.

By preferring a showdown with Debono on budget day, Gonzi could well have banked on Debono actually voting against the budget.

For by proceeding to present the budget without submitting to Debono, Gonzi managed to put an end to the backbencher's game of keeping the government alive while constantly humiliating it in parliament.

Losing a vote on the favourable terrain of a positive budget was clearly better suited to the party's electoral fortunes, than prolonging the agony in parliament.

Moreover, by knowing beforehand that the budget would not be approved, the government was given a carte blanche to propose measures which it would not even be in a position to implement.

But the fact that government knew beforehand that the budget was doomed did undermine the credibility of budget measures, which would be taken with a pinch of salt.

But Gonzi still underestimated the perseverance of the rebel MP when he deemed him "irrelevant", thus inviting Debono to constantly seek to remind him that he is still "relevant".

By calling a two-month campaign instead of a single-month one (as has been the norm post-1987), Gonzi has managed to hold the election at exactly the same time he held the election in 2008.

Prolonging the agony

Yet despite arriving this far, the prolonged face-off with Franco Debono and other rebel MPs like Jeffery Pullicino Orlando has left a toll on Gonzi's government. It experienced what the Italians refer to as 'logorio del potere' (the attrition of power).

As former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti put it: "power weakens those who don't have it". And by denying Gonzi a viable parliamentary majority, Debono and other backbenchers were constantly weakening Gonzi's power without actually bringing him down.

Faced with polls showing Labour leading with 10 to 14 points, by avoiding an early election Gonzi saved himself and his party from the jaws of a certain defeat.

In fact, despite surviving a confidence vote in January thanks to Debono's abstention, Gonzi's government increasingly looked like a terminally ill patient kept on life support.

It was in these circumstances that Gonzi played his first chess move aimed at bolstering his credentials as leader.

He did so by calling for a leadership contest in which he stood as a sole candidate.  The result was an easily foreseen conclusion, with Gonzi being approved by 96% of delegates.

But the one-horse race was met with widespread scepticism, and largely backfired. Instead of being acclaimed as a strong resurgent leader, Gonzi was once again humiliated in his bid to gain time.

Not only did the gap in the polls actually increase from 9 to 14 points between January and March, but the party was also trounced in local elections by a margin of 14 points.

Subsequently, the PN continued to trail by 12 points. Constant bickering on its parliamentary benches has constantly derailed the PN's campaign.

A farewell to GonziPN

Yet something was already brewing in the Prime Minister's head in February.

Following his confirmation after a 96% plebiscite among councillors, Lawrence Gonzi formally decreed the end of GonziPN.

"It was not Gonzi who won the last election, but the party as a whole," he declared, while adding that it was not enough to be head of government, but that one also had to be the leader of a government which was close to the people, while remaining and at the people's disposal.

But this raised the question: can the PN ditch GonziPN without ditching Gonzi, and how could the party renew itself while struggling to remain in government in the face of an unresolved political crisis?

But it was only after surviving the summer recess, and after losing a minister and an ambassador, that Gonzi could proceed to address his leadership quandary and only thanks to a bizarre sequence of events which led to John Dalli's resignation from his post as EU Commissioner.

Gonzi's masterstroke

The decision to nominate Tonio Borg as EU Commissioner has given Gonzi the golden opportunity to pave the way for the new leadership tandem and present an element of discontinuity and change before the general election.

But in so doing, Gonzi took a gamble, as Tonio Borg had to face the uncertain prospect of a grilling in which his conservative views on issues such as gay rights and abortion were openly questioned by a sceptical parliament.

But Borg was ultimately approved, sparing the country from a humiliation and enabling Gonzi to solve internal political problems.

Ironically, it was John Dalli's controversial exit from his post as European Commissioner which set in motion a sequence of events that led to Busuttil's election to the 'Number 2' spot.

Ominously, on Independence Day Gonzi started speaking of offering the people to vote for change... by re-voting the PN in office.

The fact that the prime minister was informed of the OLAF investigation on John Dalli on 5 July may suggest that he had enough time to dwell on the possible repercussions of this case - including who to appoint as new commissioner in the eventuality that Dalli had to resign.

Tonio Borg's vacancy offered the PN the opportunity of presenting a designate leader along the present leader, a leadership tandem which relies on a mix of Gonzi's experience in handling the international recession and a more dynamic deputy leader who makes up for Gonzi's conservatism and who had no part in those decisions which erodes trust in the PN leader.

Simon Busuttil was the ideal candidate. Not only does he now make it a point to reveal his 'yes' vote in the divorce referendum, he was not even an MP when the honoraria issue arose.

By presenting a leadership tandem, the PN also raised the profile of its deputy leader, something which immediately presented the PL with a difficulty, considering that its deputy leaders - Anglu Farrugia and Toni Abela - lacked Busuttil's appeal to middle of the road voters.

Ultimately, Gonzi's chess move was to start a domino effect which culminated in Anglu Farrugia's decapitation following his lacklustre performance in the debate with Busuttil.

But to make Busuttil's election credible, the PM had to play another card.

He immediately made it clear that he wanted Busuttil to be contested.

This was because Gonzi was not keen on having yet another one-horse race reminiscent of his own re-election as party leader in February, which was met with widespread cynicism.

Therefore, Gonzi banked on one of his political heavyweights to step in to give a greater legitimacy to Busuttil's election.

For a one-horse race would have simply confirmed Busuttil in the role as Gonzi's anointed one, something which defeated the very purpose of the contest: that of presenting an element of discontinuity to enable voters to vote for change while still voting for the PN.

With strong candidates like Mario de Marco and Chris Said, who were reluctant to burn their future chances after the election, it was Finance Minister Tonio Fenech who took the cue.

The Prime Minister kept himself aloof from the contest, while other senior Cabinet members actively backed Fenech.

Ironically, the decision by Cabinet members - including Austin Gatt - to support Fenech against Busuttil offered party strategists the opportunity to present Busuttil as an agent of change and discontinuity. 

By supporting Fenech, they played an important role in a script which required the new kid on the block to win an internal battle against the old guard, before proceeding to confront Labour head on.

One major disadvantage the PN had before last weekend was the perception that the election was foreseen conclusion, with surveys showing Labour holding on to an insurmountable lead.

This served to demoralise PN supporters.

Surveys held after the budget showed the gap narrowing down from 12 to eight percentage points, which wasn't enough to dispel the notion that a Labour victory is inevitable.

It was only Anglu Farrugia's poor performance in a debate pitting him against Busuttil, and his subsequent resignation, which rekindled a sense of enthusiasm among PN voters that would seep into the festive atmosphere. Coupled to this was Gonzi's strong-arm tactics with regards to two judges, one accused of misconduct and the other of bribery.

But the fact that the PN is now being perceived as having a fighting chance shows that Gonzi's political chess moves over the past month, which culminated in the election of Simon Busuttil as party deputy leader, are paying off.

But this could not be enough to reverse the implosion ushered by the 2008 result, which saw Gonzi winning with a mere 1,500 votes, and a fragile one-seat majority.