[ANALYSIS] PN leadership | Situation vacant: a sidekick for Simon?

Simon Busuttil's support among PN councillors matched the level of support he enjoys among current PN voters. But being the favoured choice of the majority within a minority is not enough to win the next crucial electoral appointment, that of MEP, which is due next year. This raises the question, Can Simon Busuttil afford to have any other perceived establishment figure as his deputy leader?

Busuttil's popularity among PN voters was evident in a MaltaToday survey conducted last month among 500 randomly chosen respondents. In fact Busuttil enjoyed the support of slightly over 50% of respondents - the same level he enjoyed among the 900 councillors who voted on Saturday.

But the same survey showed Busuttil trailing behind former Tourism Minister Mario de Marco in all the other categories of voters, including former PN voters who switched to Labour in the last general election.

This suggests that while Nationalist councillors were in sync with the wishes of 43% of voters who still voted PN in the past general election, they were out of sync with the wishes of voters at large.

Busuttil's popularity among current Nationalist voters was already evident in the general election, in which the former MEP snatched 58% of PN votes in the eleventh district and 52% of PN votes on the ninth district. But Busuttil's strong affirmation in the election did not dent Labour's strong lead in the country.

In some ways this was the latest instance in a trend that emerged in the 2004 and 2009 MEP elections, when Busuttil won a large share of the Nationalist vote despite the poor result of his party.

All this suggests that Simon Busuttil's victory on Saturday at the hands of the restricted circle of 900 inward-looking councillors could thwart the party's attempts to woo switcher votes.

While councillors could have been keen to reward Busuttil for standing up to be counted before the 2013 general election, they may have missed the bigger picture.

Busuttil's role in the defeat could be the greatest obstacle in his bid to win back thousands of former PN voters who deserted the party in 2013.

For Busuttil was already projected as the new face of the PN in the bid to woo disenchanted Nationalists during the electoral campaign. In this sense the election of Busuttil as leader lacks the sense of novelty which catapulted Joseph Muscat to fame in his first days as leader in 2008.

Parallel lives

Had Busuttil not contested for deputy leader before the election, he might well be in the same position as Labour leader Muscat in 2008 - a face of novelty and innovation, highly popular with the party's grassroots and openly backed by the party establishment.

But the similarities end there. Despite being perceived as an acolyte of Alfred Sant and being openly backed by party stalwarts like Jason Micallef and George Vella, Muscat had no visible role in Labour's defeat in 2008 and could therefore project himself as a game changer for Labour.

Although like Busuttil today, Muscat was not the favourite candidate among floating voters and Nationalist voters, who preferred George Abela, Muscat was less of a divisive character in 2008. This was thanks to his five-year spell as an MEP, during which he managed to exorcise memories of his vehement opposition to EU membership and his call on Alfred Sant to act as a lion in his confrontation with Dom Mintoff.

In fact fresh from the party's third consecutive defeat but facing a one-seat majority government, councillors gave Muscat a blank cheque in his bid to transform the party into a victorious electoral machine - power which enabled him to ditch former ally Jason Micallef by abolishing the post of general secretary and ultimately to remove deputy leader Anglu Farrugia on the eve of the general election.

On the other hand Busuttil now has to dispel the image that he was Gonzi's anointed one, owing his rise in the party to an elaborate chess move which first saw him appointed as Gonzi's civil-society envoy in February 2012 and then as the replacement for former deputy leader Tonio Borg (who had replaced John Dalli as EU commissioner following the latter's controversial resignation).

In this sense Busuttil has to prove himself fast, facing his first electoral appointment next year. Busuttil has already raised the stakes, aiming for a third seat for the PN in next year's MEP elections. If he fails, he risks being perceived as a serial loser and reopens the PN leadership debate. This would be devastating for him and the party.

Second time lucky?

Moreover, Busuttil was already given a chance by councillors to start to lure back disenchanted former PN voters and failed. While party councillors may think that Busuttil deserves a second chance after giving so much to the party, voters at large may be less forgiving.

For while the general-election result may have been a foregone conclusion, party insiders had hoped that by projecting Busuttil as a sort of co-leader to prop up the embattled Gonzi, the party would at least manage to close the PN-Labour gap.

In reality Busuttil may well have found an already-prepared script in which his role was to expose Labour's weakest link: deputy leader Anglu Farrugia.

Clearly the PN had put its eggs in the Busuttil basket, hoping to boost the Gonzi ticket with Busuttil's charm.

But from the very moment Muscat took the sudden and ruthless decision to ditch Anglu Farrugia for Louis Grech, Busuttil became increasingly ineffectual. As the two-month campaign progressed, Busuttil even committed a series of gaffes, culminating in his reference to Deborah Schembri's "nationalist face", which seriously backfired for his party.

In this sense Busuttil's present position is somewhat similar to that of former Labour leader Alfred Sant in 2003. Sant remained at the party's helm after the 2003 defeat.

For although Busuttil's role was that of second-in-command, the party machine projected him as larger than life, ditching GonziPN for Gonzi-Busuttil, at least at propaganda level.

The only redeeming factor for Busuttil is that he only came to his party's rescue very late in the day, becoming deputy leader a month before the electoral campaign started, in what was more of a strategic pre-electoral move than a substantial change in the party's leadership.

Still, by fronting the campaign, Busuttil also burned bridges among floating voters turned off by the divisive tone of the party's electoral campaign. One risk for Busuttil is that his actions as opposition leader, where he is duty-bound to keep the current government in check, will be interpreted as divisive, simply because of memories of the party's divisive electoral campaign.

On the other hand he cannot afford to appear too soft, as this would disappoint both hardliners and discerning voters, who expect strong opposition to a government with hegemonic ambitions.

One positive aspect of Simon Busuttil's programme was his promise to discuss and propose concrete alternative policies while in opposition. By projecting himself as a policy-maker he could evoke a healthy contrast to Muscat's first days as opposition leader, which were characterised by emotional "I love you" speeches.

But the major risk taken by councillors who voted Busuttil on Saturday is that the wider electorate will interpret their vote as a message that the PN has continued to ignore their message by reconfirming Simon Busuttil instead of choosing de Marco. According to public opinion polls, de Marco was the frontrunner among non-Nationalist voters.

Busuttil's challenge is to reclaim the goodwill of non-Nationalist voters by reinventing himself as a strong leader - disassociated from the previous administration. Ultimately the silver lining in Busuttil's election is that being perceived as Gonzi's anointed one means he is under more pressure to prove himself as an inclusive leader who can bring about change in his party.

Countering the perception that he was himself part of the clique, Busuttil has already recognized that the party needs to shake off the long-held image, whether accurate or not, that it is run exclusively by a small group of people.

"Much as this image may be denied, there is no doubt that it is perceived as reality," he has said, adding that the new leadership must make sure there is no place for cliques or exclusivity. Now he is expected to practise what he preached.

Ironically, to achieve this aim, he may well need Mario de Marco as his sidekick.

History repeating itself

If Busuttil were to openly support de Marco as the party's new deputy leader and de Marco accepted the offer, Busuttil would have clearly distanced himself from Lawrence Gonzi's style of leadership.

If he accepted, de Marco would find himself in the same position as his father back in 1977 after he won 40% of the PN's vote against Fenech Adami's 51%.

The seeds of disunity in the PN were sown after the divisive 2004 contest, in which John Dalli was left in the cold while Tonio Borg, who represented the same social-conservative streak as Gonzi, was appointed deputy leader.

The end result of this was a closing of ranks in the party, which became increasingly associated with its dominant conservative faction.

One advantage for Busuttil is that last Saturday's leadership contest was far less bitter and acrimonious than the one pitting Gonzi against Dalli. This would make it easier for the two aspirant leaders to work together.

Moreover with the backing of 38% of councillors, de Marco enjoys greater support in the party than Dalli, who was backed by just 24% of the party councillors.

Busuttil also has to recognise that the backing of 50.3% of councillors is a far cry from the 72% that supported him in his bid for the deputy leadership in December 2012. His position is even weaker than Gonzi's in 2004, when the latter won the support of 59% of councillors.

If Busuttil were to openly support de Marco in a bid for the deputy leadership, he would be emulating Fenech Adami's foresight in convincing de Marco senior to accept the post of deputy leader in 1977.

Fenech Adami managed to involve both Guido de Marco and Censu Tabone in his front bench right up until the 1990s, when both of them were crowned for their loyalty by being offered the presidency.

Historically the party managed to combine the very different leadership styles of the elder de Marco and Fenech Adami effectively through the turbulent 1980s. Although both leaders appealed to the party's centre-left on social and economic matters, de Marco was perceived to be more liberal, thus contributing to the party's development as a coalition of social liberals and moral conservatives.

Still, a Busuttil-de Marco coalition would leave the party's conservative wing unrepresented in the party's leadership. While de Marco and Busuttil diverge on style, emphasis and their proximity to the party's establishment, both project themselves as being more socially liberal than Gonzi.

This could create internal difficulties, if the conservative wing manages to recover from the divorce-referendum setback.  But the prospect of a socially conservative deputy leader like Beppe Fenech Adami would be a devastating blow for Busuttil's attempts to mend fences with liberal voters, who deserted the party in recent years.