PN’s electoral loss analysis a stunning judgement on the Gonzi years [REPORT]

Simon Busuttil should consider resigning if he does not get the PN back into government within 10 years, a party commission analysing the 2013 electoral loss has told PN leader Simon Busuttil.

The recommendation is one of many in a 38-page analysis that suggests that while in Opposition, a PN leader should stay on for a maximum of 10 years in a bid to avoid unpopular party leaders stay on during a losing streak.

The same suggestion was made for ministers, whom the commission said should serve for a maximum of 10 years irrespective of the ministry they occupy, and also for the Prime Minister - a bold suggestion that runs in the face of party tradition in Malta.

In its report, the commission - chaired by Ann Fenech, with Mary Anne Lauri, Simon Mercieca, Rosette Thake and Malcolm Custò - did not shy away from identifying all the factors that informed the electorate's desire for a change in government, which gave Labour an unprecedented 36,000 vote majority with a nine-seat majority in parliament.

And its honesty appears disarming: clearly outlining the reasons for the PN's burgeoning unpopularity, pointing out Lawrence Gonzi's decidedly conservative line of politics and inability to control backbench unrest, and also - without expressly mentioning Nationalist pundit Daphne Caruana Galizia - referring to "sympathisers writing in their own blogs... whom the PN should have repeatedly disassociated itself from when such blogs dealt with comments of a personal nature".

In its veritable tour de force of the last five years of Nationalist government, the report is impressive in outlining what went wrong - it seems everything, barring the strong economic fundamentals of the economy.

Read between the lines of its diplomatic wording, the message to Simon Busuttil is not to emulate Lawrence Gonzi.

But little, if nothing, was said about Busuttil's own performance as deputy leader throughout the 2013 general election - with blame falling squarely on government ministers, rebel MPs, Gonzi's exclusionary style of government, and the PN's siege mentality that turned many of its own supporters away and straight into Labour.

Many were the reasons outlining the unpopularity of the Gonzi II administration:

Amongst them listing the choice of a small Cabinet that led to many disappointed backbenchers and a lack of management on the civil service;

Small ministerial secretariats that were unable to handle super-ministries like those created by Lawrence Gonzi;

Gonzi's unflattering choice of using an SMS to tell his former ministers they were not being reappointed for his second Cabinet in 2008;

The perception of an internal 'clique' and accusations of arrogance against the executive served to reinforce a negative perception;

The impression that no real rapprochement had taken place with former PN leadership rival John Dalli;

Rebel backbenchers who rued having been left out of a ministerial promotion, manifested "an enormous and unacceptable level of disloyalty" which in part could have been informed by the way Gonzi addressed their issues, appearing as if he had no control of his own parliamentary group;

The 'Franco Debono problem' held the government's one-seat majority at ransom, until he gave the government its coup de grace in December 2012 - the commission said his actions had been "highly irresponsible";

Parliamentary filibustering, the unethical leaks from the PN parliamentary group to the media, the attempts to placate rebel backbenchers by appointing them parliamentary assistants, the choice of certain appointments on government boards and commissions, and the economic recession, were also factors that undermined the government's popularity;

A series of crucial issues also determined the general unpopularity of the PN government:

A failure to address inefficiency inside ARMS and its billing customer care; the perception of corruption in the choice of heavy fuel oil for the operation of the Delimara power station; the oil scandal that MaltaToday broke, which led to the electorate "not understanding why nobody from the authorities had realised what was happening"; the honoraria saga; the public transport reform fiasco; privatisation reforms that left workers negatively affected, tough Tax Compliance Unit audits and VAT penalties, and minor income tax cuts that were delivered too late in the day; the way the government dealt with the La Valette multi-manager property fund saga; the divorce saga; the dampened property market and the effects of a reform in the Permanent Residency Scheme; gay rights and an impression that the government was "insensitive" to this part of the electorate; and censorship.

The commission also said that although the PN was decidedly anti-racist, it failed to transmit this message well in the face of a hawkish Labour currying favour with a tough stance on irregular immigration.

It added that Labour managed to win the vote of Malta's sizeable Muslim community, while Lawrence Gonzi appeared to be moving on strictly confessional and Catholic lines, as exemplified in his conservative stance on divorce.

The commission rightly identified the biased nature of state broadcasting under the PN government and the bad relations with the independent media as an important factor in a breakdown of communication with the electorate.

And it found a host of shortcomings in the way MEPA permits were issued, and a lack of attention to over-development in the urban environment.

Party leadership

The report said Gonzi was too occupied with government work to see what was happening inside the party, while secretary-general Paul Borg Olivier himself was careless of party sectional committees while the PN entered its current financial doldrums.

Criticially, it accused former MPs Franco Debono and Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando of not showing loyalty to the party, especially when they ultimately celebrated Labour's victory in March. "Irrespectively, when they left the party, they took away with them a certain number of votes," the commission said, saying the same effect was felt with former MP Jesmon Mugliett.

The commission said that many of those it had interviewed remarked on the difficulty of former minister Austin Gatt's personality, but it praised him as being one of the government's more focused and determined ministers. "Many felt it was a mistake to announce him as the electoral manager after he said he would be leaving government. The perception was that there was a lack of consistency in the way decisions are taken."

The commission said the PN was wrong in holding back from introducing a party financing law, and accused the party's inner core of adopting a policy of exclusion that led to the depature of key political supporters who switchd to Labour.

Elections 2013

On its electoral campaign, the commission described the PN's 2013 foray as inert, negative, giving scant importance to its manifesto in favour of negative campaigning, ignoring the cool factor in voting Labour, the anti-establishment mood prevailing with the electorate, a lack of volunteers, and few high-profile candidates that were more present inside Labour.

It also said the PN media itself excluded some of its candidates, and that the PN used "poor and negative" billboard messages.

Labour on the other hand appeared clearly organised and sent clear messages that undermined the image of Lawrence Gonzi, that painted Labour as being safe for business, in favour of meritocracy, divorce, gay rights, youth issues, and carried out an electoral strategy based on a presidential style, using star candidates, a positive campaign and an aspirational and collective slogan that inspired unity.

The commission also said that using the news cycle, the Labour electoral strategy used its media successfully, creamed the market with online ads, and created new ties with the artistic community.

Recommendations

Going by some of the commission's recommendations, the Nationalist Party must emulate an internal reform that Joseph Muscat made for his Labour Party, in preparation for the next elections.

The commission said the party will have to appoint a chief executive to manage the party's financial affairs, currently languishing with a reported €8 million deficit, and create a team of outside volunteers that are not tied to the party structure, to assist the party - a formula adopted by Muscat to create a core network of supporters who were not tied to the electoral whims of his party's general conference.

In its 38-page long executive summary of the electoral analysis, the commission's recommendations seemed replete with language adopted by Muscat's Labour in the run-up to the 2013 elections.  The PN had "open itself up to people with new ideas", the commission said, and work in open consultation with its own backbenchers and understand why a big part of its on electorate had not voted for the PN.

The commission also said the PN should support a party financing law that was staunchly promoted by former Nationalist MP Franco Debono, set up a college of former MPs and candidates and a customer care service, and foster a more "objective and credible" media whose editorial line "does not insult the intelligence of its audience".

The commission also suggested that the PN's current television channel should seek to improve its own productions "particulary with who can offer quality entertainment for families", it said, by introducing new TV personalities - a factor in the upsurge of audience for Labour's One TV over the past five years.

The commission also suggested that its own members are trained to communicate effectively on online blogs, and to have the party carry out its own regular press briefings with the press. It also suggested that an English-language print or online medium was essential for the party.