Cabinet minutes | Borg Olivier considered closing down NATO base
Cabinet papers shed light on former Prime Minister George Borg Olivier’s strained relationship with NATO.
A memorandum by former Prime Minister George Borg Olivier presented to Cabinet on 10 March 1965 shows that the Maltese government was considering the closure of the NATO headquarters in Malta.
This was one of five options Borg Olivier's administration was considering in reaction to the military alliance's refusal to admit Malta as a full member.
According to the memorandum penned by Borg Olivier "the withdrawal of NATO from Malta is an option which deserves consideration." The memorandum does not mince words in saying that "Malta is not enjoying any material benefits from the presence of HAFMED (Headquarters Allied Forces Mediterranean)."
It described Malta's undefined relationship with NATO as "a political liability", because while an attack on any NATO member state would have involved Malta in a war due to the British presence in Malta, no clear obligation on NATO existed to intervene on Malta's behalf in case of attack.
"Malta is presently an appendage to NATO with no share in the formation of policy."
The memorandum explored several options for Malta's future relationship with NATO including a unilateral offer of protection by NATO, associate membership in NATO and withdrawal from the organisation.
The main drawback of the closing down of NATO facilities in Malta, according to Borg Olivier, was that this step could have led to a further reduction of the UK military base.
While noting that it was unknown whether the British wished to retain any defence installation if HAFMED in Floriana was shut down, Borg Olivier believed that Italy would still have had a vested interest in the "close association" of Malta with the west.
Borg Olivier observed that from a defence aspect, Italy stood to lose from Malta's independence as it would had to face the risk of Malta being overrun by a political enemy or subscribing to doctrines "inimical to the principles of NATO."
The memorandum concludes that although the indications were that full membership is not attainable, as some members were opposed to Malta's inclusion in the organisation, "a sure way of forcing the issue would be to make a formal request for admission of membership to NATO."
Associate membership was described as a status which could be regarded "as commensurate to our size and contribution" which would give full protection to Malta. But Malta would still have been denied a vote in the council of Ministers "and would not be able to influence policy."
The memorandum was prepared after a meeting between Borg Olivier and NATO deputy general secretary J.A. Roberts, two days after independence, on 23 September 1964.
In the meeting Roberts suggested that an immediate application for full membership should not be submitted.
Roberts also asked for "tangible evidence" that Malta would give full facilities to HAFMED and its personnel to "enjoy all privileges and immunities" enjoyed before independence.
He even went as far as suggesting the wording of the document to be signed by Malta. Borg Olivier replied that the government was prepared to ensure that HAFMED would continue to enjoy all present privileges and immunities. But he did not exclude in any way an eventual application for full membership in the organization.
But despite Borg Olivier's discomfort with Malta's subservient relationship to NATO, this state of affairs continued to persist in the following years. A memorandum by the Minister for Foreign Affairs presented in February 1969 reveals that NATO was asking Malta to host an "on call force" in Malta.
The force was to be initially composed of three ships provided by Italy, the United Kingdom and the US. The aim of this force was to "demonstrate the solidarity of NATO nations and to contribute to the overall deterrent in the Mediterranean."
The force was to be called up for training exercises twice a year and could be called to "demonstrate NATO naval presence in a threatened area."
In the memorandum the foreign minister declared that while the Maltese government was in favour of closer ties with NATO it was under constant "internal pressure" on this issue.
Therefore the memorandum suggests that further military cooperation must be accompanied by tangible economic benefits. It also raises the question on whether Malta should have accepted the force in the absence of defence guarantees, especially if the Soviet Union regards Malta's role in the new force as an "unfriendly act".
NATO asked to finance new power plant
The demand for financial assistance from NATO countries resurfaces in a Cabinet memorandum presented by the Minister for Trade on 20 September 1968.
According to the memorandum, NATO general secretary Manlio Brosio had suggested that although NATO could not dispose of any such funds, it could influence member nations to take greater interests in the economic needs of Malta.
The memorandum suggests that the aid should be directed towards the construction of a new power station which should have been operational by 1977. The document reveals that a suitable site for the new power plant was being selected and suggests a "south eastern" location of the plant in view of the free port zone projected in the area. The overall cost of the new power plant was put at £28 million.
Relations with Soviet Union
A memorandum presented to Cabinet in 1966 reveals that the government was at pains refusing overtures of friendship from the Soviet Union, which was demanding diplomatic representation in Malta. The demand was reiterated in a letter attached to a gift to the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the launching of the space craft Luna 9.
The government was warding off the Soviets by suggesting that relations should be conducted through representatives in London. The excuse given was that Malta was not able to cope with the establishment of further diplomatic missions in Valletta.
"So far Malta has been able to hold off the Soviet Union on what can only be described as very implausible reasons," the report states. It warns that "any more rebuffs to the Soviet Union might provoke hostility" and notes that Malta was alone not to have diplomatic relations with the USSR.
It also states that relations with the Soviet Union were inevitable "whatever the internal political difficulties in taking such a step." While acknowledging the "danger in receiving aid from the USSR", Western states "should not take Malta too much for granted."
Sugar-coated agreement with Taiwan
An aide memoire issued in April 1967 reveals that Taiwan promised 9,000 tonnes of sugar as a donation to Malta following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Malta and the Republic of China.
At that time Taiwan still claimed to represent the entirety of China, questioning the legitimacy of the People's Republic under communist rule. Taiwan was extremely grateful for the support given by Malta to Taiwan in the United Nations.
Another memorandum dealt with a request by Israel to establish diplomatic representation in 1964. The report suggests "an attitude of complete neutrality in the dispute between the Arab world and Isreal" and that friendliness must be shown towards both camps. Therefore requests for diplomatic representation should be accepted from both sides.