A hunter’s choice: A Yes or a boycott?

In 1990 92% of the Italians who turned out to cast their vote, voted in favour of the abolition of a law granting hunters free access to open private fields and for a repeal of hunting laws deemed to be too favourable to hunters.

But the referendum did not obtain the required 50% quorum (only 43% turned out to vote), and was declared null and void. A repeat of the Italian debacle is probably the worst fear of the Coalition Against Spring Hunting.

Hunters in Malta are faced with a dilemma: whether to participate and thus legitimise the referendum or to boycott the referendum, insisting that it violates their rights as a minority.

On Monday. asked about the possibility that the FKNK could direct its members to boycott the referendum, FKNK general secretary Lino Farrugia said the options were to vote or not to vote and directions and directives would be issued in due time.

If the FKNK opts for a boycott it would be banking on an alliance between hunters, their families and a critical mass of people who would not vote because this issue is not a priority for them.

The reasoning behind a boycott would be that the sum of those who would not vote because they could not care less and those who would not vote to defend their hobby would sink the referendum

The council factor

One serious obstacle against success for this strategy is that half of Malta will be voting anyway in local elections, which normally draw a turnout of over 50%. The 2012 election held in half of Malta had a 59% turnout.

In fact it was hunters who lobbied the government to postpone local elections to 2019, to secure a stand-alone referendum. But after being floated, this proposal was aborted by the government.

It is extremely likely that people voting for their council will also vote in the referendum. Moreover political parties will be busy mobilising voters to vote for their candidates in local elections.

Yet in localities where local elections are not held there may be less motivation to vote. Hunters may still be able to exercise pressure on voters. This is because if hunters were to issue a boycott directive, anyone seen to be voting would be defying their directive. A tactic based on peer pressure may be effective in small rural villages where hunters can exercise peer pressure on their next of kin and friends, but would be less effective in large urban centres. 

Moreover such a tactic, especially if enforced by veiled threats, may well backfire, as voters tend to shun any attempt to curtail their right to express themselves freely.

A clear choice

Moreover since the result is legally binding and the legal notice allowing spring hunting would be immediately revoked, hunters cannot resort to fantastical calculations (like those made by Alfred Sant after the 2003 referendum on EU membership, adding non-voters, the deceased and pro-hunting votes together).

Any split between the “yes” voters and abstainers will mean a sure defeat for the hunting lobby. 

Therefore in this case hunters’ organisations cannot afford to send mixed messages; their message must be a clear call to vote “yes” (in favour of retaining spring hunting) or not to vote. 

One major factor is that the Maltese traditionally register a high participation rate in elections.

The divorce referendum, which was stand-alone, also had a 72% turnout.

A MaltaToday hunting survey in September showed that 60% agree with a referendum on this issue being held, while 52% would surely vote in it. A further 18% said they would probably vote.

Therefore if this were to be the case on polling day, hunters would be heading to a collective suicide if they refrain from voting.

Moreover any decision to abstain will probably not be supported by either of the two major parties, whose leaders will be expected to respect democracy by voting in the referendum. The fact that both Joseph Muscat and Simon Busuttil will probably be voting in the referendum would be in sharp contrast with any directive not to vote. None of the two leaders can afford to shun an exercise in democracy.

Moreover a boycott directive may be counterproductive as voters who normally do not vote because they can’t be bothered, may end up voting simply because they do not want their abstention to contribute to a hunters’ victory.

Who will mobilise most voters?

If hunters were to take the decision of participating in the process, their only hope is that of mobilising more of their supporters than the anti-hunting brigade.

This may in fact be the “yes” campaign’s greatest strength.

In this aspect the “yes” campaign already has two advantages; the date of the referendum and the question itself.

Had the referendum been held after or during the spring hunting season, there was a strong possibility of a repeat of incidents of illegal poaching, such as the killing of storks, which caused an outrage in civil society. This would surely galvanise the “no” vote.

Moreover hunters will be voting in the knowledge that if the referendum passes, the spring hunting season will not open this year. On the other hand if the “yes” prevails, the season will open a few days after the referendum is held. This increases the sense of urgency among hunters to do whatever possible to safeguard their hobby.

The question (dictated by discrepancies in the Maltese schedule of the law) asking voters to vote yes if they want to retain spring hunting and no if they want to abolish it, does give the hunting lobby an advantage as they will be able to campaign on a “yes” platform.

So far all referenda in Malta have been won by the yes campaign.  

It could also result in confusion among voters opposed to hunting, many of whom have become used to vote “yes” in previous appointments.

Yet the anti-hunting lobby can bank on greater support than the hunting lobby.

The most recent surveys show support for a spring hunting ban at around 50% against 34% who want to retain spring hunting.

Yet much depends on whether those opposed to spring hunting will actually turn out on voting day. Moreover surveys had also shown a sharp drop in support for the spring hunting ban among Labour voters following last June’s MEP election, during which the PL came out strongly in favour of the hunting lobby.  

This led to a fall in support for the hunting ban from 59% in July 2013 to 44% in June 2014. Support for the spring hunting ban increased again to 50% in September 2014 even if 51% of PL voters were opposed to it. The angry reaction of hunters against the government’s decision to suspend the season in autumn may well backfire on the hunting lobby, by eroding their support among Labour voters. On the other hand despite the PN’s non-committal stance, 73% of PN voters support the ban on spring hunting.

The ability of hunters to mobilise their families, friends and sympathisers cannot be underestimated. While the anti-hunting lobby managed to gather a 41,000 strong petition, which has been verified by the electoral commission, hunters have also gathered a 100,000 strong (but never verified) petition in an attempt to thwart the referendum.

Ultimately a lot will depend on the effectiveness of the rival campaigns to mobilise voters. While hunters start at a disadvantage due to their poor reputation, marred by past illegalities, environmentalists may be less present on the ground and may appear aloof from bread and butter issues.

One risk faced by the “no” camp is that of seeing their campaign overshadowed by other issues, which may well eclipse the referendum. Moreover, it may be difficult to keep interest in a referendum pitting bird lovers against hunting enthusiasts. Ironically the insistence by some environmentalists on politicians taking the backseat may well further dampen interest in the referendum.

Still the Coalition Against Spring Hunting may manage to create momentum for the simple reason that the referendum is the first initiative by civil society to assert itself independently of the two major political parties and make history. It remains to be seen whether this historical moment will capture popular imagination.