Concrete suppliers deny any knowledge of weak concrete

Devlands Ltd director Martin Deguara and Tal-Maghtab Construction Ltd directors Dennis Baldacchino and Raymond Sciberras have all denied any knowledge of weak concrete being used during the construction of the Accident and Emergency Department at Mater Dei Hospital.

A damning report compiled by judge emeritus Philip Sciberras found that the “pervasive weak concrete found [within Block D1.1 and Block D1.3] is a result of intended fraudulent actions”.

The inquiry established that most concrete placed in columns was provided by Mixer Ltd, even if other suppliers, including Tal-Maghtab Construction Ltd, Blokrete Ltd and Devlands Ltd provided concrete and concrete-based materials to the site.

“Therefore it cannot be ascertained with certainty that all concrete placed in the columns of areas D1.1 and D1.3 originated from one supplier,” the board of inquiry reported.

Repeated attempts to contact Mixer Ltd owner Bastjan Dalli proved futile; likewise Joseph Fenech of Blokrete Ltd. On their part, Devlands Ltd and Tal-Maghtab Construction insisted that they didn’t know anything.

“I am currently abroad… I heard there was something in parliament but I don’t know anything else,” Deguara said.

Baldacchino said that he had no comment to make, while Sciberras said he was not aware of anything.

Contacted by MaltaToday, a spokesperson for Skanska said: "Skanska takes these claims very seriously. We have a high ethical standard. But we have not received this report and can therefore not comment on it."

The inquiry stated that the responsibility and contractual liability for the failures identified in the technical reports compiled by Innovative Architecture Structures and Ove Arup ultimately lie with Skanska JV.

The technical analysis carried out categorically indicated that the discrepancy in the concrete strength specified in the contract – from C30 to C18 – was not a consequence of normal wear and tear or bad maintenance, “but is rather the consequence of substandard material used in the site, and bad workmanship”.

The inquiry concluded that the report be sent to the Attorney General and Police Commissioner, among others, after concluding that “widespread failing uncovered by the present day technical reports indicate that the pervasive weak concrete found in the site is a result of intended fraudulent actions”.

“Moreover, the Board is left with a distinct impression that events as they transpired were not the fruit of coincidence or providence but seem to indicate an element of concertation and direction,” the inquiry report reads.

Tests carried out by contractor

The board discovered that most of the tests on the quality of concrete were carried out by the contractor himself with a small sample being tested by the Kordin facility of the Works Division. It transpired that only one out of every five tests was carried out by the Works Division.

“The board has enough evidence to determine that the tests provided by the contractor are fraudulent. […] Considering the extent of the defective concrete found on site, it is evident that such defect could not be a result of genuine mistake or failure of oversight, but must have been the result of a concerted effort from which the contractor, suppliers and possibly third parties benefitted.”

It transpired that a number of tests were rubberstamped by Blokrete Ltd but the inquiry could not be certain that Blokrete Ltd itself and its officials were directly involved or the perpetrators.

The inquiry traced and reviewed extensive concrete tests spanning the months from January to September 1996. 

A senior technical officer at the Works Division said that the samples were not taken by Works Division officials but were delivered directly by employees of the contractor to the laboratory. This was corroborated by a lab technician who confirmed that samples were brought directly to the lab by Skanska JV employees.

Asked if this was the norm, Alfred Kitcher said: “No. No. The norm is that we usually collected it ourselves.”

The structural reviewer who ‘could see corruption’

Perhaps the most interesting testimony was given by architect Albert Cauchi, whose role was to review the structure and carry out onsite inspections. Cauchi told the inquiry that there were various occasions on which he had to stop the contractor from proceeding with certain works due to bad workmanship or work practices and had ordered that some works be demolished. 

He complained that it was impossible to oversee the works on the whole site due to very limited manpower.

During the interview, Cauchi lamented that he wasn’t respected and at one point he went on a rant exclaiming that “no one knew where the Lm200 million had gone to”.

Referring to the design and built cost plus contract as “obscene”, Cauchi said it was “corruption. I could see it. And those who couldn’t, well they were keeping their eyes closed.

Last week, Bastjan Dalli said that he supplied “a very small fraction of the concrete for the Mater Dei project and I did this as a supplier to one of the subcontractors with whom I had a long standing relationship well before the Mater Dei project started”, referring to Blokrete. 

“I also state that in 1996 I never supplied concrete to the Mater Dei project alone as there were always other suppliers and contractors involved. I did not supply any concrete to Mater Dei from end-1996 onwards. I was never a subcontractor on the project.”

Cauchi told the inquiry that Mixer Ltd had not been involved from the start and went on to allege “political decisions” for his involvement.

“I’m sorry to say that it became political. And you could see this from the type of contractors. Who placed them there. Then Minister Dalli came in, in charge of the cost plus. He was everything.”

Dalli has denied Cauchi’s comments.

Specifically asked if he had suspected that work was not being done properly, and that everyone knew that the work was not being done properly but was being told to just let it be, he solemnly declared: “yes yes, exactly” [yes yes, dik].

Asked about Cauchi’s comments, architect Martin Attard Montalto told the inquiry that he [Cauchi] had “a chip on his shoulder”.

Questions raised along the years

Minutes of a Project Management Office technical meeting dated 3 April, 1996 revealed that concerns had been raised regarding the quality of concrete test results. A discussion followed regarding whether results were within specification or gave rise to concern with “MS [sic] concluded that he was very concerned about the consistency of the test results even within batches”.

A letter dated 11 July, 1996 issued by Ortesa and addressed to PMO following a site inspection raised numerous concerns with the situation on site. Principally (a) that “quality of works totally insufficient and not acceptable in many areas”. The letter was accompanied with various photos evidencing, according to Ortesa, poor quality of reinforced concrete work and compaction, bad levels of cast concrete in walls and bad positioning and alignment of predalles. Area D1.3 featured on more than one occasion in the photos evidencing bad workmanship.

Correspondence between various entities was reviewed, including a letter by Ing Carlo Mereghetti to Don Verzè where he declared that the state of the construction site was “absolutely unacceptable”.

Mereghetti said that the works were in delay and the contractor did not seem to have the human resources to remedy the situation. He also reported lack of site security.

The inquiry also questioned former health minister Louis Galea as to whether any problems were encountered regarding the process and quality of works. While at first he said that during his time as minister no one had flagged any issues, Galea changed his initial categorical statement when presented with various documentation. 

Faced with a 1996 Bovis Europe report, Galea said that he had a vague memory of it but does not recall discussing the details. He similarly stated that he could not recall the Ortesa reports but conceded that he must have seen it since it was discussed at an FMSS meeting.

Likewise, he said he could not recall the details of a confidential letter he had received from architect Vince Cassar.

Who is Don Luigi Verzè?

Something to laugh about - Silvio Berlusconi and Don Luigi Verzè (right)

In the Sciberras report, former health minister Louis Galea, who represented the government on the Monte Tabor Foundation, said that San Raffaele founder and FMSS member Don Luigi Verzè – who was accused of bribing public officials and having links with the Mafia – did not undergo a due diligence process.

Instead, Galea said, the due diligence was done on the San Raffaele scientific institute and hospital itself, adding that “(FMSS member) Dun Charles Vella continuously worked for the country’s best interest”.

Vella was instrumental in convincing Galea and the former PN administration to reach an agreement with Verzè and his hospital and Vella blamed the medical lobby for Alfred Sant’s decision to discontinue the relationship with San Raffaele. 

Verzè was under investigation in connection with a €1.5 billion debt amassed by the cutting edge hospital he founded in Milan. He famously courted former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, whom he had described as “God’s gift to Italy.” 

Interestingly, the Sciberras report quotes architect Emanuel Attard, who said that during a meeting in September 1996, then Prime Minister Eddie Fenech Adami had stormed out of a meeting because “the Italians” said that “it’s easier to reach an agreement with a communist country than with the Maltese.” 

Inferior concrete quality

Two separate reports, one compiled by Innovative Architecture Structures and another by Arup, confirmed that the strength of concrete at Mater Dei is measurably lower than what is specified in the contract. 

Moreover, the Arup report concluded that the hospital design does not meet seismic design criteria and requirements. The design failures are further exacerbated by the weakness of the concrete.  

The report states that the weak concrete is not a result of deterioration but poor construction (aggregate type, water, cement ratio, poor compaction etc).

The durability of the structure is at risk due to the poor quality of concrete – especially columns in high humidity environments are at risk of corrosion to the reinforcement and a regular inspection and repair regime will need to be implemented. 

Repairs to the service tunnel to Block D1.1 were not effective and the Arup report suggests that further remedial works are needed to prevent further deterioration of the concrete. 

At least €35 million will have to be spent to make the hospital safe, according to international consultants.