Concrete tests were ‘rubbish’, consultant said in 1996

A memo in 1996 from a consultant inside Mater Dei’s project management office (PMO) had alerted management of individual test results used in the construction of the hospital, which he described as “r*****h” [rubbish] and warned that if core samples failed the testing, PMO would “have a big problem on our hands”.

The memo by Martin Smith, from May 1996 and sent to architect and project manager Martin Attard Montalto, is considered to be an important fresh piece of evidence for the now-reopened inquiry being led by retired judge Philip Sciberras, investigating the use of inferior quality concrete of the Mater Dei hospital.

“I still maintain that the individual test results, due to their range, are poor (r*****h),” Smith told Attard Montalto. It is not known whether Attard Montalto alerted then health minister Louis Galea about the contents of this memorandum.

The memorandum sent by Smith to Attard Montalto

Smith wrote the memo after receiving a copy of a concrete test accompanied by a number of observations, showing that questions over the veracity of the tests and quality of concrete used were being raised. 

This is further evidenced by a comment by Smith who asks whether there would be a failure if the entire sample were to be “discarded”.

The original contract clause required two test samples at 28 days, with the pass or fail criteria being the average of the results. 

The clause, Smith explained, allowed for a test result to be discarded if a “test manifests evidence of improper sampling, molding or testing”. If both show such evidence the entire test would have been discarded. 

“Skanska are testing three cubes at 28 days, which is good. If we have two results close and a third a lot lower, then that one would be discarded and the average of the two higher would give a pass result. 

“Ortesa [subcontractor] are sniffing around this issue thinking they can make some capital out of this, and are very keen on core tests. My feeling is that concrete will pass a core test, particularly with the extra time it has to cure.”

Smith concluded that: “there are grounds for Skanska to argue successfully that the concrete test results comply with the letter of specification. I still maintain that the individual test results, due to their ranges, are poor (r*****h). We should instruct Skanska to take one core of one of the deliveries in question. This should satisfy honours all round, if it passes the Client will have to pay and there will be no need for further tests. If it fails then we have a big problem on our hands.”

Fraudulent concrete tests

The first inquiry led by Sciberras has already unearthed a letter dated 11 July, 1996 issued by Ortesa and addressed to PMO following a site inspection, raising numerous concerns that the “quality of works [is] totally insufficient and not acceptable in many areas”.

The letter was accompanied with various photos evidencing, according to Ortesa, poor quality of reinforced concrete work and compaction, bad levels of cast concrete in walls and bad positioning and alignment of predalles (slabs).

Area D1.3 featured on more than one occasion in the photos evidencing bad workmanship.

The Project Management Office was set up in 1993, when architect Vince Cassar, together with university rector Fr Peter Serracino Inglott, had agreed to set up the PMO under the auspices of the Works Division and Malta University Services Ltd. In 1992, Monte Tabor Foundation – contracted with the design of the hospital – appointed Ortesa Spa as its subcontractor to prepare all the relevant designs. 

PMO had engaged Attard Montalto as the project manager. Other architects involved were Frank Cortis and Albert Cauchi.

Appearing before the inquiry, Attard Montalto was asked whether, on the basis of present day technical reports, the PMO failed in its obligations and duties especially with regard to the client’s interest. According to the inquiry, Attard Montalto said: “If it results so, I am very shocked and I would never have expected this based on what I believe we did correctly to ensure that things were done properly. [But if it results so] something has gone wrong. You cannot deny it.”

The evidence given by Frank Cortis “did not elucidate much on the main scope and investigation of the board”, the inquiry said.

On his part, Cauchi, whose role was to review the structure and carry out onsite inspections, told the inquiry that there were various occasions when he had to stop the contractor from proceeding with certain works due to bad workmanship or work practices, and had ordered that some works be demolished. 

Complaints of limited manpower overseeing the works on site were also raised.

The Sciberras inquiry found that most of the tests on the quality of concrete were carried out by the contractor himself with a small sample being tested by the Kordin facility of the Works Division. It transpired that only one out of every five tests was carried out by the Works Division.

“The board has enough evidence to determine that the tests provided by the contractor are fraudulent. […] Considering the extent of the defective concrete found on site, it is evident that such defect could not be a result of genuine mistakes or failure of oversight, but must have been the result of a concerted effort from which the contractor, suppliers and possibly third parties benefitted.” 

It transpired that a number of tests were rubberstamped by Blokrete Ltd but the inquiry could not be certain that Blokrete Ltd itself and its officials were directly involved or the perpetrators. 

The inquiry traced and reviewed extensive concrete tests spanning the months from January to September 1996.  

A senior technical officer at the Works Division said that the samples were not taken by Works Division officials but were delivered directly by employees of the contractor to the laboratory. This was corroborated by a lab technician who confirmed that samples were brought directly to the lab by Skanska JV employees. Asked if this was the norm, Alfred Kitcher said: “No. No. The norm is that we usually collected it ourselves.”