[ANALYSIS] On her marks, get set... stumble

If a new party does take off, what hurdles stand in the way of Marlene Farrugia in the obstacle race towards winning a seat in parliament? JAMES DEBONO asks

Marlene Pullicino: The problem for third parties could be deeper than pragmatic choices by voters. (Photo: Ray Attard)
Marlene Pullicino: The problem for third parties could be deeper than pragmatic choices by voters. (Photo: Ray Attard)

1. Not choosing the lesser evil

The Maltese electoral system gives voters two choices: their first preference on the ballot sheet determines which party will govern the country, and their subsequent choices determine which candidates are elected to parliament. 

By voting for a third party with a remote chance of it being elected to parliament, voters automatically disenfranchise themselves from determining which party will be in government. 

Since people make pragmatic choices in elections, voting for a third party may feel disempowering. This is the result of changes to the constitution, which automatically gives a majority of seats to the party having the relative majority. 

Until the 1981 election it was a completely different story as the outcome was determined by the result of the last count determining the number of seats for each party in parliament. This led to the perverse result of 1981, which saw Labour winning a majority of seats though the PN won a majority of votes.

The resulting change of 1987, to prevent such a result happening again, also had a collateral impact on third parties. 

Before the 1987 constitutional amendment giving an automatic majority of seats to the party with more than 50% of the votes, people could vote for a third party in the full knowledge that their subsequent preferences could still determine the composition of the government. The principle was reinforced by constitutional amendments, which extended the automatic seat majority to the party with a relative majority. 

The amendments apply only to a scenario where only two parties are elected to parliament. If another party is elected, it is the party or coalition with a majority of seats, which would form a government. But in a situation where voters perceive as remote the chance of electing a third party to parliament, potential third party voters may prefer having a say on who will be governing to investing their vote in a party whose votes are a statistical detail.

Although the electoral system allows cross party voting, thus giving third party voters the chance to determine which candidates are finally elected, not having a say in determining which party is preferable in government may put off people from voting for a third party. In practice this means that third party voters can help a candidate from an established party to be elected but cannot express a preference about which of the two parties would be in power. This is because although these voters may prefer the policies of a third party they may still have an over riding fear of one of the main parties being elected to govern. The power voters have of keeping the ‘lesser evil’ out of power, may ultimately be the greatest enemy of third parties. 

Yet the problem for third parties could be deeper than pragmatic choices by voters. For even in elections for the European Parliament, where voters are not choosing a government, the duopoly was only shaken in 2004 when Arnold Cassola was close to being elected after winning a tenth of votes cast in that elections. Since then duopoly was reinforced even at this level AD has garnered only 2% of the vote in subsequent elections to the EU parliament. 

2. The electoral system

The electoral system based on the single transferable vote does not necessarily penalise third parties. In fact the system was designed by the British colonial power to forestall the rise of one big nationalist party and to encourage the fragmentation of the vote. In fact Malta did experience a multiplicity of parties in parliament in the 1920s, the 1950s and the 1960s but this failed to stop the drift to a duopoly.

In Ireland, which has a similar voting system, eight parties and various independents are represented in parliament. In this country smaller parties vigorously campaign for second preferences through door to door campaigning. Vote transfers from larger parties could also technically help third parties get elected at district level. Even in local councils in Malta, AD has managed to elect candidates with the same system, benefitting from vote transfers from larger parties whenever it won a substantial amount of first preferences. Through this system AD has become a fixture in the elected Sliema and Attard local councils. 

Part of the problem in national elections is the size of constituencies, which elect five MPs each. This means that third party candidates technically need around 16% of the vote to get elected on the basis of first preferences. At council level electing a third party candidate is easier for the sheer reason that some localities elect more than 10 representatives – thus substantially lowering the ‘quota’ needed for election. 

Surely they can get elected with fewer first count votes if they also attract a large number of second preferences. 

One major problem for third parties in Malta is that they do not sufficiently exploit the voting system to benefit from vote transfers. Yet instructing voters to transfer their vote after voting for one of the big parties is very complicated. For the third party would only benefit if they attract the second preferences either of candidates elected with a very big surplus of votes (like party leaders) or weaker candidates whose votes are transferred in their entirety. A third party will never benefit from a second preference inherited from a candidate who just makes it to parliament with no surplus of votes above the district quota.

3. The prospect of instability

Third parties are also haunted by the perennial question of with whom they would ally themselves if they manage to get elected to parliament. This concern would only increase if voters perceive a realistic chance for a third party to get elected. This is because if a third party candidate makes it to parliament, the 1987 amendment securing a majority of seats for the majority party will no longer count. In such a scenario a party with more seats but fewer votes than its chief rival may end up governing the country. Moreover if the two major parties get an equal number of seats, the third party may end up determining who governs the country. 

Surely one may rebut the claim that third parties are a recipe for instability by arguing that this is already the case when a single party government relies on a one-seat majority. Both the Sant and Gonzi governments suffered the fate of being toppled by a defector from their own ranks. But a multiparty democracy is not necessarily associated with instability. Germany, which has Europe’s most stable economy, has had coalition governments for most of its post war history. Most countries in Europe are run by coalitions and most of these last a whole legislature.

Yet post war Malta has only had a brief experience of coalition governments. That was in the early 1950s, which saw the Malta Workers Party of Paul Boffa allied with the Nationalist Party.

Interestingly one minor party which managed to avoid the instability question was the nascent Labour Party in the 1920s when it signed a pre-electoral pact with the larger Constitutional Party through which both parties not only bound themselves to transfer votes to each other but also to govern together by signing a common platform.

Yet ever since third parties have shied away from lobbying one of the main parties into a pre-electoral coalition – which could arguably be the safest way of entering parliament by attracting the votes of those who want to elect a third party in government while securing the lesser evil in government.

AD considered running on a common list with the PN before the 2004 election which determined Malta’s membership of the European Union but the PN refused its overtures, offering instead the post of Speaker to AD in return for AD not contesting the general election. The offer was refused by AD, which still contested the election by appealing to pro EU voters to give their second preference to AD. But the strategy was publicly rejected by PN leader Eddie Fenech Adami, who called on his voters not to take such risks.

4. The option of not voting

Apart from voting for another party, disgruntled voters also have the option of not voting. This was probably the preferred option of Mintoffian voters in the 1998 election following the epochal clash between the old titan Mintoff, and Alfred Sant. The Nationalist Party was also penalised by a larger abstention in PN leaning areas in 2013, even if switchers largely determined the scale of Labour’s victory.

By not voting, voters also know that they are sending a loud and clear message to the political parties. This is because parties have access to the names of voters who do not vote but have no access to the names of those who vote for third parties. Not voting is also an easier option for angry disillusioned voters than walking to the polling booth to cast a vote for a party with few chances of being elected. Moreover in a clientship system, parties would be more ready to heed the grievances of these voters, of whom they take note, than of invisible voters for a third party.  Not being able to dispense patronage naturally puts third parties at a disadvantage. In fact protesting by not voting may be more effective for those seeking a favor.

5.Lack of resources and money

AD has been handicapped by a perennial lack of resources. Unlike the PN and PL it does not own a TV station. It had even sold the radio it once had and stopped publishing its own newspaper. With all these limitations AD still managed its best electoral result in 2013, by attracting 1.8% of the vote despite lacking even a premises. This showed that exploiting the mainstream media and a good performance in debating other party leaders, as was the case with Michael Briguglio in 2013, could work to the advantage of credible third party leaders.

But the 2013 result was still a far cry from parliamentary representation. Third parties risk being overshadowed by the glitz of costly campaigns by the two behemoths. Imaginative campaigning, crowd funding and charismatic candidates may help reduce the imbalance. Yet so far third parties have not succeeded in mobilising an “insurgency” of on-the-ground campaigners like those who catapulted independent socialist Bernie Sanders to the national stage in the current US democratic primaries.

6.Conflict of personalities and ideologies

Third parties may end up attracting a hotchpotch of personalities, who have an axe to grind against the two big parties but lack the ideological glue that is required for long-term survival. Reports on Marlene Farrugia’s new grouping suggest that the new grouping is already facing this problem, with the Greens who were involved in talks with Farrugia expressing their unwillingness to lose their identity.

It also remains to be seen how strong indepenent minded personalities like Salvu Mallia will fit in a political party. Farrugia’s designation of the group as “centre left” appears more than an attempt to lure disgruntled Labour supporters than a concrete project. Moreover it remains to be seen how any new grouping will tackle issues like civil liberties, European integration and immigration. Still the new party may resolve this impasse by binding itself through a set of commitments for democratic and constitutional reform, leaving members at liberty on other issues.  One may well argue that the big parties are themselves a coalition of people with very different views on many issues.

The problem is that the convergence of the big parties to the centre ground has left gaps both to their right (which led to the alienation of eurosceptics, xenophobes and Christian conservatives) and to their left (which led to the alienation of both traditional socialists and civil society activists with a green and liberal agenda). Therefore there is also a sizeable crowd who are seeking a new political home which fits their ideological leanings.

Although there may be instances where old school anti EU socialists may find common ground with the nationalist right wing (something reflected in Ivan Grech Mintoff’s Alleanza Bidla), any such platform is off-putting to both mainstream liberal voters and also to those who yearn for a more left wing political force. Another option would be to converge to the centre already occupied by the main parties while emphasising issues related to good governance (similar to the centrist Ciudadanos party in Spain). But any new party needs to rely on idealistic volunteers who are bound to be fired up by a more radical ideological programme. 

Reconciling the different strands which may be attracted to the prospect of a new party is already a difficult task; putting all together in a hotchpotch veers on the impossible. Even AD, which was relatively ideologically homogenous, finding a home in the left wing European Greens, has often experienced clashes between powerful and assertive personalities.

Moreover, AD faced a constant turnover, losing prominent members like Saviour Balzan, Peppi Azzopardi, Toni Abela, and Wenzu Mintoff who either drifted back to the party of origin or left politics altogether to become leading protagonists on the media landscape.

AD was wary of projecting its chairperson, a role initially occupied by Wenzu Mintoff, who held on to his seat in parliament, as a party leader. Under Harry Vassallo the party managed to renew itself, attracting a new generation of activists mostly derived from Moviment Graffitti. The party for a time also capitalised on Arnold Cassola’s near miss in the 2004 MEP election, but failed to build on the momentum, scoring a dismal result in the 2008 general election. The party managed to grow in the 2013 election, despite the PL landslide, but the sudden departure of Michael Briguglio in the wake of the 2013 election, after the party’s best result, left a vacuum and the re-election of veteran Arnold Cassola as chairperson gave the impression that the party had stagnated.

Azzjoni Nazzjonali, another ideologically homogenous party on the conservative right, which attracted strong personalities like former PN firebrand Josie Muscat and entrepreneur Angelo Xuereb, also failed to survive and even lacked AD’s ability to cope with disappointments at the polls.

Norman Lowell’s Imperium Europa has so far managed to occupy the space on the hard right, despite its leader’s extremist views, which included the idea of shooting migrants on the high seas. But the IE party remains indistinguishable from its leader and has so far failed in fielding candidates in all districts in a general election.