Taliban blowback: from friend to foe to power-brokers

Back in 2001, regime change in Afghanistan was celebrated in the west as the overthrow of a repressive, misogynistic regime which made the world shudder after blowing to smithereens the Buddhas of Baminyan, amidst horrific reports of stonings and beheadings.

It was the Taliban’s refusal to hand over 9-11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden which gave US President George W. Bush the pretext to attack Afghanistan in retribution to the attack on the Twin Towers. On that count, the war against terror failed in its target. Bin Laden was only killed in 2011, in a US ground invasion on a compound in Pakistan in 2011.

But the six-week airstrike campaign in Afghanistan had served as a prequel for the more devastating invasion of Iraq, which proved lucrative for private military contractors and ended up destabilising an entire region for decades to come.

For what proved difficult in the both wars, was not the ousting of a despicable regime, but the task of restoring the peace. While the disintegration of the Taliban forces by American ‘shock and awe’ gave an illusion of a quick success, the task of building new political institutions proved elusive against a Taliban-led insurgency, which ultimately triumphed the moment the US left the country to its own devices.

Meltdown

For it was the swiftness of this disintegration which took many by surprise exposing the complete dependency of the post 2001 Afghan state on the US war machine. For while the Taliban’s participation in a future interim government following more rounds of negotiations was widely expected, the quick meltdown of the Afghan army was not.

Biden who himself last week declared that Afghans ‘must fight for themselves’ ended up recognising that the collapse “did unfold more quickly than anticipated.”

This sudden meltdown ensured that the Taliban would gain power in the absence of any solid guarantees over crucial matters like women’s rights and the security of millions of Afghans branded as collaborators for working with foreign occupiers. This failure strengthens the case for international responsibility for the fate of those fleeing the Taliban regime.

Was it all in vain?

Despite this major setback the US may well have achieved its primary aim: that of ensuring that the Taliban will not harbour terrorists with designs to harm it. This was achieved through direct negotiations in Qatar commenced under Donald Trump with Joe Biden following through with the withdrawal of troops. By engaging in direct talks, the US gave the Taliban the recognition it still denies to groups like Hamas.

But this also comes as a realisation that diplomacy may be more effective then war in preventing terrorism. And yet it was achieved at the cost of emboldening the Taliban to restore their archaic brand of Islam and reverse the few positive changes made in the past two decades.

For the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 did bring about significant progress in terms of women’s rights and education. Back in 2001, there was not a single girl enrolled in a secondary school and only 9,000 were at primary schools. By 2017, 3.5 million Afghan girls were in school, and around a third of students at public and private universities are women. Yet the occupation not only failed in bringing an end to violence but resulted in an escalation, with US and government airstrikes responsible for 2,122 civilian deaths including 785 children, between 2016 and 2020. Since 2001 nearly 80,000 civilians have lost their lives, alongside 76,000 Afghan police and soldiers, 85,000 insurgents and 3,600 US and allied troops.

And Afghanistan remains one of the world poorest countries with only six countries worldwide – among them Burundi, Somalia, and Sierra Leone – having a lower GDP per head than Afghanistan. Moreover a fifth of Afghan GDP is reckoned to come from the opium trade, much of which has been controlled by the Taliban.

Restorers of order

In short, the country remained destabilised, with the Taliban once again re-emerging from chaos to restore order.

They had already done so in 1996 when the Taliban moved in to put an end to the chaos of civil war between rival warlords in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. In so doing, the Taliban were actively assisted by Pakistan, a key US regional ally, with its own regional designs pitted against India.

Their first gruesome action was abducting the last communist leader of Afghanistan from UN custody, whose castrated body was dragged behind a truck through the streets of Kabul.

And while the Taliban gave the war-ravaged country a semblance of peace, it came at the great cost of greater oppression of women, religious intolerance against Shiites and Hindus, and restrictions on daily life, including a ban on pop and folk music and beard shaving.

Blowback

Yet the Taliban’s brand of radical Islamism was itself bred in the belly of the beast, nourished by the US assistance it received during the days of the anti-Soviet insurgency of the 80s and 90s.

Following the logic of Cold War politics, a motley crew of Islamist ‘mujahedeen’ that included rich Saudi adventurers like Osama Bin Laden and regional strongmen, were actively backed by the Americans and western allies in an attempt to deal a blow to an ailing Soviet Union.

In short, at that time the ‘enemy of my enemy’ was a valuable motto with little consideration for what would happen when this enemy becomes too powerful to tame. It was the same logic that created monsters like Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who for a time was seen as a bulwark against the Iran of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Ironically, it was under the Afghan communist regime propped by Soviet troops that most progress was made in gender equality in education and healthcare, extending progress made under the monarchy – whose 1964 constitution proclaimed equality and banned discrimination – to the countryside, thus further angering conservative clerics.

Once again that progress is at risk as the Taliban move in to fill a vacuum created by a failed military occupation.

Much now depends on how much the Taliban crave international recognition and economic assistance, and how far the US and key regional powers will make this conditional on basic respect for human rights including women’s rights.

Taliban Mark 2

This time around, the Taliban are showing signs that they are not oblivious to world opinion, committing themselves to respect women’s rights including that of attending schools and universities, albeit with the proviso that this should be “within the norms of Islamic law.” This suggests that this time round the Taliban dread complete isolation from the rest of the world, which could shut them out from lucrative commercial deals and Silk Road diplomacy.

Major players like China may be more interested in guarantees from the Taliban not to shelter armed groups hailing from Muslim populations like the Uyghurs, which China is actively oppressing, than in seeking humanitarian guarantees which they themselves do not even respect.

The return of the Taliban to power poses a test to the international community’s commitment to uphold human rights and not to turn a blind eye on asylum seekers fleeing the Afghan hell-hole. If the Taliban do change their outlook on human rights, it would show that negotiation is far more effective than war in bringing about change. Still, much depends on the firmness of their interlocutors when sealing deals with the Taliban.