Muscat is repeating Gonzi’s divorce mistake

That ‘history repeats itself’ is a well-worn expression. But that it should repeat itself so soon (and with such accuracy) speaks volumes about how little we actually learn from past mistakes in this country. It is as though politicians of all hues are endlessly condemned – not unlike some tragic Greek hero cursed by the gods – to always stumble at the same hurdle, over and over again, for all eternity.

One hurdle that has cropped up more than once of late concerns referenda. Maltese governments have (let’s face it) consistently encountered difficulties with this particular democratic tool: we all saw the problems caused to the Gonzi administration by the 2011 divorce referendum; and now, we can all see Joseph Muscat floundering in much the same waters when faced with the same basic dilemma.

But while I wasn’t expecting Muscat to be any less suspicious of direct democracy than his immediate predecessor, I did at least expect him to avoid making the same mistakes that Gonzi made only four years ago.   

And not without good reason. For just as Lawrence Gonzi had (tragically, with hindsight) hitched his political chariot to a campaign that was doomed to fail, Muscat had done quite the opposite at the time. It seems the Labour Party leader understood the dangers of associating too closely with a cause that might not enjoy universal support. His approach to the divorce referendum therefore reflected a certain political shrewdness that was absent from the PN’s policy stables: Muscat demonstrated that he was more acutely attuned with the unspoken wishes of the electorate than his political adversaries… and that’s kind of helpful, when you also depend on the same electorate to get into power.

The resulting discomfiture for Gonzi in 2011 may not have had a direct impact on the electoral defeat that was to follow: but it certainly didn’t help the Nationalist campaign. Gonzi emerged from that referendum a wounded prime minister. Having aligned his party, in no uncertain terms, to a cause which was duly rejected by the electorate, he then had to hastily scramble to reinvent the PN’s outlook on so-called ‘liberal’ issues in time to renew its relevance by March 2013. 

It was a classic case of: “Remember all that stuff we said about divorce, oh, just two months ago? We didn’t really mean it, you know…” Not exactly a very reassuring electoral campaign message. Makes you wonder whether they ‘really meant’ all the other things they said in their manifesto, too…

In fact, the enormity of Gonzi’s political miscalculation would become apparent long before the election. Having nailed his colours to the mast, the Prime Minister was then forced – by the law of political consistency – to ultimately vote against the electorate’s wishes as expressed in that referendum. One can argue endlessly about the wisdom of this decision; but what it also illustrates is the undeniable fact that one mistake inevitably leads to another. 

Had Gonzi steered clear of active involvement in the divorce campaign from the word go – as any political adviser worth his salt would have recommended – he would have had no personal record to subsequently defend, and no ‘conscience’ to worry about when approving the referendum result in parliament. But as things worked out, he was left with the option of either dogged defiance in the face of defeat, or contradicting his own former stance. A veritable choice of evils if there ever was one.

In any case: this is all water under the bridge, at least as far as Gonzi himself is concerned. But the water is still flowing for Joseph Muscat. The Prime Minister was in Gozo at the weekend to campaign ahead of local council elections. And despite having earlier declared his intention not to ‘intervene’ in the spring hunting referendum campaign, Joseph Muscat went ahead and did precisely that while addressing a meeting in Qala.

Paraphrased from various press reports, this is what he said:

a) that Malta should retain spring hunting so as not to be any ‘less’ than its European counterparts, and;

b) that Opposition leader Simon Busuttil, though openly declaring his intention to vote ‘Yes’, is actively working behind the scenes to bring about a ‘No’ victory.

Oh, and he also added, as a sort of Parthian ‘warning’ shot, that “Simon Busuttil is against spring hunting”.

Hmm. Try as I might I can’t see how either statement can conceivably work to the prime minister’s advantage. For starters, the first declaration goes several miles beyond declaring his own voting intentions, as both party leaders have done. Muscat is no longer expressing a personal opinion here; he is articulating a Yes campaign argument – flawed though that argument may be – and as such, taking a direct, active role in the Yes campaign.

It is the direct equivalent of that ill-fated decision by the Nationalist Party executive to take up a policy position against divorce in 2011. We can all see with hindsight how disastrous that proved for the PN… though some of us saw that disaster coming (and said so at the time) without the benefit of hindsight. 

There is, however, an important difference between the two scenarios. Then as now, polls (at least, ours) had all along given an indication of the result. But in the case of the divorce referendum, the ‘Yes’ victory still came as an earth-shattering surprise to many. So when he took that ill-fated decision to back the No vote, Gonzi actually believed he was backing a winning horse. A mistake it may remain, but there was at least a certain rationale at work behind the scenes.

The same cannot be said for Joseph Muscat today. Polls have consistently indicated a No majority ahead of the spring hunting referendum. Admittedly, it is still too early to predict an outcome on that basis alone; much still depends on voter turnout on the day itself. As I write it has just emerged that 51% of voting documents have not been delivered or collected. I imagine this figure will dwindle as we approach referendum day; if not, that statistic alone is already enough to invalidate the result. 

All the same, what the polls indicate is that a majority is opposed to hunting in spring… whether or not this translates into an actual referendum victory. 

So by projecting himself as part of a campaign that appears (for the time being, at any rate) out of synch with the popular mood, Muscat risks imparting the impression of a prime minister who is out of touch with electoral reality… just as Gonzi had inadvertently done, with tragic consequences, in 2011. 

But it is the second statement that quite frankly beggars belief. I have no idea if it is actually true – certainly I’ve seen no indications of any tacit support for the No camp by the PN – but my reaction upon reading that was: fantastic news. If true, it is arguably the first decent thing Busuttil has done as opposition leader since taking over in June 2013.

And here is where Muscat’s intervention suddenly seems bizarre. It is as though he is consciously encouraging us all to associate his political rival with a very probable victory, while he backs the other team. This at a time when there is no visible reason to associate Busuttil or the PN with the No camp at all… in fact, everything points in the opposite direction.

Why would Joseph Muscat want to do that? Personally, I can only see one possibility (though I admit there may be others). My guess is that he has genuine faith in his own ability to turn the tide. Muscat has calculated that the only force in this country capable – at this late stage – of making a difference is an injection of mindless partisan allegiance into the debate. By consciously associating Busuttil with the No campaign, he hopes to trigger a knee-jerk response among Labour voters who are motivated only by a primal urge to score points over the Opposition. 

If so, it is a monumentally dangerous strategy. In case of backfire, not only would Joseph Muscat have pre-emptively catapulted Simon Busuttil to a (probably undeserved) winning position... but he would also have shattered the perception that his own aura is capable of achieving any political objective, against any odds.

There is an inescapable irony, too. Muscat himself had been offered the same lifeline by Gonzi in 2011. And we all know who gained and who lost from the experience.

At this point, you might ask: ah, but what if the risk pays off? What if Muscat does indeed manage to sway the result by his mere involvement alone? Wouldn’t that increase his own stature?

Perhaps, but at a severe cost to himself. Intentionally or otherwise, Joseph Muscat has now transformed this referendum from a question about spring hunting, to a question about whether ‘mindless political allegiance’ should remain the be-all and end-all of the entire local decision-making process. And this runs directly counter to his own repeated claims that he intends to achieve the clean opposite goal: i.e., to elevate Malta above the petty rat-race of partisan politics. 

I think Joseph Muscat may need reminding that it was this promise – the so-called ‘new way of doing politics’, and the hunger for such a change that undeniably exists among the electorate – that originally propelled him to power with such a huge majority.

So even if successful in the short-term, Muscat’s endorsement of the Yes campaign will surely return to haunt him in future. He will be forever branded as the public face of Malta’s internecine political divide… the man who encouraged Malta to keep up its increasingly childish ‘blue versus red’ mentality; the man who championed and perpetuated a culture of political pique, instead of valiantly trying to rise above it.

How much better for all concerned, if he resisted repeating the mistakes of the past…