The anatomy of defeat

While PN puts on a brave face in the aftermath of the biggest electoral beating since Independence, reading the summary of its Defeat Report was indeed a déjà vu moment. In parts it reminds us of some humbling lessons Labour had to learn in its numerous and successive disappointments. While each electoral campaign unfolds in distinct ways, the anatomy of fefeat has common features.

Successive defeat reports show that disengagement disconnects parties from potential voters. People reject politicians who insulate themselves into Ivory Tower because this breeds group-think and paranoia. As a result, criticism is dismissed, civil society activists are deemed to be idiosyncratic individuals, failures are interpreted as misperceptions' and all political 'others' become enemies.

When severe cracks appear within the party elite, they serve as indicators that the leaders failed to turn dissent into opportunities for renewal. The party machinery stalls each time disagreement degenerates into destructive rebellion.  

Voters want accessible politicians. Door-stepping and contact with communities remain vital. As parties try to shed a political culture typified by clientelism, the magic word has become "customer care".  In spite of some unrealistic expectations, most demands are in fact related to public rights: insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles, shortages in public services like the waiting-lists in hospitals and old people's homes, and redress to injustice.

Broadly, electors still seek good governance and they punish lack of transparency as in Delimara II, the ministers' honoraria and serious corruption allegations on oil procurement.

Successive defeat reports show that media communication efforts will only help if used wisely. Turning public broadcasting into a government PR machine is very likely to backfire. The frequent use of "no comment" or efforts to stop the press asking inconvenient questions will have adverse effects. On one hand blatant party propaganda tends to put off discerning voters.

On the other hand, party members know that party-owned media are useful tools to ensure pluralism but there is also awareness that these must not erode party finances. 'New media' and blogging positively extended debates beyond party propaganda but there is a backlash against personal attacks in specific blogs.

It is now an internationally established fact that negative campaigning does not work on the eve of elections in any liberal democracy. Then voters wish to evaluate electoral proposals and they expect the parties to show that they can deliver. Labour learned its lesson the hard way; it was rather surprising that PN made such a silly mistake in this election.

If we unpack defeat reports we will find that voters expect leadership and direction, however they do not want politicians to stubbornly bulldoze their way on matters that impact on their everyday lives. Ignoring public responses in the case of the divorce referendum, the cost of living, ARMS, MEPA and Arriva was a huge mistake.

These were in fact reminiscent of the way Labour had turned a blind eye to people's expectations and aspirations, starting from Mintoff's importation restrictions, to KMB's stand on private education and Sant's rejection of EU membership.

In my view it is a pity that after a huge effort, the 2013 defeat report was published only AFTER all key PN appointments were already esablished. This significantly limits its impact. In fact it has already been noted that conveniently the Commission selectively named and blamed individuals who are no longer in the picture. It was not a surprise that Dr Simon Busuttil was spared criticism.

Moreover, it boldly celebrates the role of Dr Lawrence Gonzi as a "statista" who turned Malta into "one of the nicest places in the world to live in" while it hardly mentions his political responsibility when he clinched to power in spite of a year-long political crisis and a budget defeat in Parliament; and then his late in the day decision to resort to the longest electoral campaign in history.

As acknowledged by the PN defeat Commission, in 2013 the Maltese were very ready for change.

Nonetheless, the report fails to identify who led the party into its most devastating electoral humiliation ever.