Anti-EU populism: MEP elections to deliver gains to far-right

The 2024 European Parliament elections could see a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU, and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats.

A study by the European Council on Foreign Relations, authored by British political scientist and pollster Simon Hix amongst others, predicts that anti-European populists are likely to top the polls in nine member states: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia; or come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden).

The ECFR’s forecast predicts almost half the seats will be held by MEPs outside the “super grand coalition” of the three centrist groups – the EPP, S&D and liberals Renew.

“This ‘sharp right turn’ is likely to have significant consequences for European-level policies, which will affect the foreign policy choices that the EU can make, particularly on environmental issues, where the new majority is likely to oppose ambitious EU action to tackle climate change,” the ECFR said.

Far-right parties are also becoming increasingly dominant in national settings across many EU capitals: in November, Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party (PVV) secured important wins in the Dutch general election, whilst in France, the National Rally’s support for a regressive immigration bill showed the far-right’s important role in shaping European politics in 2023.

“2024 is likely to see a continuation of this trend not only in national politics, but also at the European level, with early polls suggesting a more right-leaning European Parliament will emerge after the June 2024 European Parliament elections,” the ECFR said.

Rise of anti-EU populists

The results show that the two main political groups in the parliament – the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – will likely continue to lose seats as in the last two EP elections.

“This reflects the long-term decline in support for mainstream parties and the growing support for extremist and smaller parties across Europe, which is resulting in an increasing fragmentation of European party systems, at both the national and European levels,” the ECFR study said.

“Despite this, we expect the EPP to remain the largest group in the parliament, and therefore maintain most agenda-setting power, including over the choice of the next commission president.”

The EPP could lose seats in Germany, Italy, Romania, and Ireland, but significant gains in Spain. The S&D could lose a lot of seats in Germany, and the Netherlands, and will gain most seats in Poland. Renew is expected to lose mainly in France and Spain, and make most gains in the Czech Republic and Italy.

Even the centrist Renew Europe (RE) group and the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) will also lose seats, falling from 101 to 86 and 71 to 61 respectively. Meanwhile, the Left group should increase their representation from 38 to 44 seats. In addition, if the Five Star Movement in Italy, predicted to win 13 seats, decided not to sit with the non-attached (NI) MEPs, but may choose to join either the G/EFA or the Left, which would bolster the number of MEPs sitting to the left of the S&D.

But the main winners in the elections will be the populist right, with far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) group expected to gain 40 seats and, with almost 100 MEPs, to emerge as the third largest group in the new parliament.

Even the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group will gain 18 seats. And, if Fidesz in Hungary, tipped to win 14 seats, joins the ECR, the latter could  overtake RE and ID and become the third largest group.

“We expect the ECR and ID groups together to account for 25 per cent of MEPs, and have more seats combined than the EPP or the S&D for the first time.”

It will be in Italy that the ECR will pick most seats, as a result of Brothers of Italy (FdI), emerging as one of the largest delegations with 27 seats.

With the expected fall of Forza Italia to only 7 seats, though, the EPP may approach Brothers of Italy to join their group. On the other hand, the ECR could lose seats in Poland, and gain most seats in Romania and Spain, in addition to Italy.

ID will however lose many seats in Italy, with the decline of Lega, but these losses will be offset by significant gains in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, and Austria.

And with the Greens losing mainly in Germany, France, and Italy, the opposite will happen for the Left. “Naturally, there is some uncertainty in these predictions. In addition to the inevitable uncertainty of current opinion polls and our forecast of the likely vote shares and seats for each national party, there is also uncertainty regarding which political groups some parties will eventually join,” the ECFR said.

Alternative for Germany's Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel at a rally in 2022

Coalition patterns

These changes will affect the sizes of the potential coalitions between the political groups in the chamber. The “grand coalition” of the EPP and the S&D, which lost a majority in the parliament for the first time in 2019, is set to lose seats, holding 42 per cent of the total, compared to its current 45 per cent.

Even with the RE group, the “super grand coalition” of the three centrist groups will only hold 54 per cent of the seats, compared to its current 60 per cent. With the average level of voting cohesion within groups in the European Parliament – which means that each group cannot always guarantee all their MEPs will follow the group voting instructions – 54 per cent of the seats might not be enough for these three groups to guarantee a winning majority when they vote together.

The left-right balance in the parliament will shift dramatically to the right. The left coalition – of the S&D, the G/EFA, and the Left – will lose seats, with 33 per cent of the total, compared to the current 35 per cent. And, even if the left coalition can secure the support of RE – which they have done on environmental and social rights issues during the current term – it would hold only 45 per cent of the seats, compared to 50 per cent in the current parliament.

By contrast, the size of the coalitions on the right is set to increase. A centre-right coalition – of the EPP, RE, and the ECR – will likely lose some seats, holding 48 per cent instead of the current 49 per cent.

However, a “populist right coalition” – made up of the EPP, the ECR, and ID – will increase their share of the seats from 43 per cent to 49 per cent. In addition, the majority of the non-attached MEPs are from extreme right parties, meaning that with their support, majority coalitions could form to the right of RE for the first time in the history of the European Parliament.

“EU-critics” on the radical right and radical left will increase dramatically to hold 37 per cent of the seats, compared to 30 per cent in the current parliament.

But the “pivotal MEP” in the next parliament is likely to be in the EPP group, rather than in the centrist RE (or previously Liberal) group for the first time.

“In short, we expect that populist voices, particularly on the radical right, are likely to be louder after the 2024 elections than at any point since the European Parliament was first directly elected in 1979,” the ECFR said.

“A wake-up call”

The academics and pollsters who modelled the study said the analysis should serve as a wake-up call for European policymakers about what is at stake in the 2024 European Parliament elections.

“The implications of this vote are far reaching for the geopolitical direction of the European Council and European Commission from 2024 onwards. The next European Parliament can be expected to block legislation necessary to implement the politically difficult next phase of the Green Deal – impacting the EU’s climate sovereignty – and push for a harder line on key issues for other areas of EU sovereignty including migration, enlargement, and support for Ukraine,” they said.

National governments will feel constrained by the way these elections shape domestic debates, affecting the positions they can take in the European Council. “This is likely to bolster the growing axis of governments around the European Council table that are attempting to limit the EU’s influence from within – those of Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden, and likely a PVV-led government in the Netherlands.”

These findings are set against the expectation that whether or not Donald Trump wins the US presidential election in autumn 2024, Europe will have a less globally engaged United States to rely on.

“This may increase the inclination of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties to reject strategic interdependence and a broad range of international partnerships in defence of European interests and values, instead seeking to pursue a more cautious approach to foreign policy decisions,” the ECFR said.

“Progressive policymakers need to start considering the trends that are driving these voting patterns and begin preparing narratives that can cut through them,” the academics added.

For example, they said policymakers must evangelise on the economic and security  imperatives – not the costs and risks – in driving forward the green transition and supporting Ukraine.

They also said they had to “recognise the nuances in European citizens’ thinking” rather than resorting to the fear-driven narratives that the far right is using successfully.

“For example, on climate, after the supply insecurity brought about by Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is a public will to rely less on fossil fuels. After the drastic weather events affecting many EU countries and reports of worse to come, there is a desire not to lose momentum on climate action, and with the new green competitiveness framing from the US, there is a will among the business community to embrace green tech – with support from their governments to de-risk supply chains, and with investment and the right regulatory and permitting environment.”

About the authors

Kevin Cunningham is a lecturer in politics, political strategist, and pollster.

Simon Hix is Stein Rokkan chair in comparative politics at the European University Institute in Florence. He was previously vice-president of the London School of Economics.

Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and the director of ECFR’s European Power programme.

Imogen Learmonth is a researcher and programme manager at Datapraxis, an organisation that provides strategic advice, public opinion research, and modelling and analysis services.