Libya after Gaddafi - how do tribes hold key to power?

It is often said that Gaddafi’s hold on power depended on the co-operation of tribal leaders. How true is this in your opinion? And how powerful is this network in modern Libya?

Gaddafi’s feeling for tribal Libya is certainly one factor that explains how he has managed to rule the country for so many years. 

However, there is no single answer to the question about how powerful tribes are in modern Libya – because different kinds of ‘tribe’ and different kinds of power are involved. 

The term ‘tribe’ (qabila) has a diverse range of social and cultural meanings. It can cover groups ranging from a hundred to a million members. And it is a feature of tribal organisation that it can mobilise cohesion in the absence of a permanent leadership hierarchy. There is no tribal office giving a single man a monopoly of institutional power at the apex. (The recent description – in the international news – of Gaddafi’s former deputy, Abdesalam Jallud, as ‘the leader’ of the important Magarha tribe is difficult to credit, even though Major Jallud has been its single most important, recent national figure.) 

The massive migration to cities over the last several decades also means that many tribal members identify more weakly with their tribe than do their rural brothers or cousins. However, their membership of certain patronage networks may have its origin in their tribal identity, even if the patronage network does not operate ‘tribally’.

Simplifying, one could say that tribes remain important as vehicles of social solidarity but are rather weaker as vehicles of political mobilisation (unless collectively owned tribal land is at stake). Of course, the current extraordinary circumstances may summon forth an extraordinary show of unity. 

Gaddafi himself hails from what was a small tribe before his ascent to power. How did he manage to enlist the co-operation that kept him in power for 42 years?

The Gadadfa tribe was considered to be a relatively minor tribe prior to 1969, but it had links with major tribes. Moreover, Gaddafi’s power after 1969 changed the status of his tribe, while some of his fellow Free Officers had important tribal links themselves.

Several factors account for his longevity in power. Oil wealth permitted him to experiment with the dismantling of state institutions, in part (but only in part) as a radical attempt to strike a path of social development more congruent with a tribal society, where decision-making within tribes would guide local governance. 

The radical ideology of the Jamahiriya could appeal to reformers, not just traditionalists. It offered new opportunities for men, and women, suffocated by traditional hierarchies of prestige, colour, age and gender.

The practice of posting revolutionary cadres and security forces in their own home town also meant that they tended to have a flexible attitude towards ‘soft’ resistance to resented laws and edicts; while oil wealth could address economic difficulties by subsidising consumption. 

A recent MaltaToday article, published before the onset of the current uprising, attributed to me the view that oil wealth and institutional flexibility meant there was no fear of a domino effect on Libya; but I never said or implied that. Even in the past, serious crises were not always averted. I indicated that these two factors could mitigate a crisis, not that they certainly would. While the term ‘tribal politics’ has connotations of ‘mindless loyalty’ to European ears, Libyan politics has never been mindless.

Depending on what happens next, the future of Libya may yet be decided by precisely this same tribal network. How do you see things developing?

How things develop depends on decisions still to be taken. In the light of the declarations of the international community, it is difficult to see Col. Gaddafi being permitted to complete a national comeback (even if he could manage it militarily). 

International military intervention that involves ground troops would – as things stand today – be deeply resented by Libyans: opposition members continue to emphasise they do not wish this. There would be a widespread suspicion of an attempt to turn their country into another ‘Iraq’.

Tribal polarisation or fragmentation is a scenario that is seriously feared by many people in western Libya. It could happen if, in a post-Gaddafi scenario, the people of western Libya fear that their future is compromised by a power shift to the east; with an armed population, one could see the country descend into further turmoil. However, it is noteworthy that it has been reported that many western Libyan localities in opposition hands have placed themselves nominally under the governing council based in Benghazi. 

In a post-Gaddafi scenario in which such a fear is allayed, tribes would be important for the maintenance of peace, local governance and social solidarity, particularly if rationing of food and medical supplies is needed during the transition. I would expect a representative government to be careful to have as broad a representation as possible of tribal affiliations, but I believe it will not be a man’s command of tribal influence that will determine the choice of minister; rather, tribal influence would tend to follow his appointment.